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Abstract 
 
We use quasi-experimental evidence on the expansion of the public subsidization of 
long-term care in Spain to examine the causal effect a change in caregiving 
affordability, as regards the caregiving allowance and the reception of home care, on 
hospital admissions (both on the internal and external margin) and length of stay. We 
find robust evidence of a reduction in both hospital admission and utilization among 
both those receiving a caregiving allowance and, albeit less intensely, among 
beneficiaries of publicly funded home care, which amounts to 11% of total 
healthcare costs. These effects were stronger when regions had an operative regional 
health and social care coordination plan in place. Consistently, a subsequent 
reduction in the subsidy five years after its implementation is found to significantly 
attenuate such effects. We investigate a number of potential mechanisms, and show 
how the effects pass a number of falsification and robustness checks.  
 
Keywords: hospital admissions, hospital utilization, long-term care reform, bed-
blocking, Poisson hurdle model, Spain. 
JEL: I18, J14, H53. 
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1. Introduction  
Healthcare systems face the challenge of responding to the rising costs of health care 
treatments, which are in part driven by an increasingly ageing population. However, part of 
this rise in the demand for healthcare is said to be due to an inefficient use of health services 
(especially hospital care) by those patients in need of long-term care (LTC). Such care is often 
not available because of limited coordination (Mur-Veeman and Govers, 2011; Hofmarcher et 
al., 2007; Bodenheimer, 2008) and, most commonly, as a result of limited affordability. 
However, only limited research has so far focused on the identification of an expansion in the 
access of affordable LTC from quasi-experimental evidence.  
We use evidence from a reform that extended the public subsidization of LTC services 
in Spain from January 2007 (referred to in Spanish as the Sistema de Autonomía y Atención a 
la Dependencia - SAAD). This unexpected reform both universalized the access to previously 
means-tested LTC services (to those qualifying after a needs test) and made it more 
affordable. One of the reform’s advantages is that SAAD was heterogeneously implemented 
in each region (e.g., differences emerged in the stringency of needs tests, diversity in co-
payment rules, etc.), which allows a reasonable identification of its effects on avoiding 
hospital admissions at both the intensive and the extensive margin (i.e., the probability of 
hospitalization and the number of hospital admissions), as well as utilization (i.e., hospital 
length of stay - LoS). An additional advantage of the estimates from SAAD is that it offers a 
second experiment to test the reform’s robustness in terms of the reduction in the subsidy in 
2012 (amid austerity cuts). Finally, given the regional decentralization of the Spanish 
healthcare system, we have been able to examine the heterogeneous effect of SAAD in 
regions with pre-existing coordination plans
1
. Finally, given that SAAD provides subsidies 
both in kind (by extending the network of home healthcare), and in cash (by providing a 
caregiving allowance), we have been able to examine whether the subsidy exerted 
heterogonous effects depending on the format.  
We draw upon data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
2004-2013, which contains a rich set of time-varying controls, both at individual and regional 
                                                          
1
 Prior evidence for Spain suggests that about 68% of all patients needing social care end up being treated by 
health services, and care management coordination can bring savings of up to 27% (Graces et al., 2006). 
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level. We can use these to measure social and health-related needs
2
. In addition, we have 
carried out a simple micro-simulation exercise to measure the effect the extension of the LTC 
subsidy has had on hospital costs. Finally, we have further examined a number of mechanisms 
that drive our results. Specifically, we describe and test the effect SAAD has on preventing 
hospital admissions, and specifically on early discharge, thereby reducing LoS. This is 
important as there were no major reforms in hospital care in the period examined.  
Our research extends the previous literature in three ways. First, unlike most previous 
studies, our estimates are based on quasi-experimental evidence. Second, we examine a 
number of potential individual-level mechanisms, such as the early detection of symptoms, 
the prevention of unmet needs (Kemper et al., 2008; Rice et al., 2009), and the provision of a 
smoother transition of care from hospital to home
3
, income, and housing quality. Third, we 
can distinguish the effect on hospital admissions and LoS. During the early post-discharge 
period, defined as the first three to five weeks, approximately 20% of the oldest patients 
experience adverse events (Forster et al., 2003) that could lead to readmissions (Naylor et al., 
2007). These effects can be significantly improved with additional support, and there is 
specific evidence to suggest that family caregiving improves patients’ reported success after 
hospital discharge and suitable outpatient medication (Bragstad et al., 2012; Scheurer et al., 
2012), and that the use of home care by the vulnerable population may reduce the number of 
hospitalizations (Konetzka et al., 2012). 
Our results suggest that after the implementation of SAAD there is a reduction in 
hospital admissions (in both the intensive and the extensive margin) and utilization (LoS). We 
find a higher reduction in the number of hospitalizations among those receiving a caregiving 
allowance compared to those receiving subsidized home care. Conversely, hospital LoS was 
shorter among those receiving home care services. Our estimates reveal a greater effect 
among regions with prior health and social care coordination plans. Finally, we examine 
certain specific mechanisms driving the effect, such as an increased use of outpatient care, the 
adoption of housing alterations, or the reduction in perceived loneliness and depressive 
symptoms.  
                                                          
2
 Administrative data do not allow controlling for important socioeconomic characteristics (income and wealth) 
that are key to understanding the effects of LTC subsidisation.  
3
 The availability of formal and informal caregivers may provide some post-acute care at the patient’s home, and 
thus reduce hospital LoS. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the literature 
to which the study contributes. Section 3 describes the background and identification strategy. 
Section 4 contains a description of the data and variables. Section 5 describes the empirical 
strategy, and section 6 contains the key results on hospital admissions, the explanatory 
mechanism, and the impact on hospitalization costs. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion 
section containing its concluding remarks.  
2. Related Literature  
 
The effect of the introduction of social care programs on hospitalizations has so far 
provided mixed results. Hospital readmissions, a lower rate of hospital-delayed discharges, 
and lower emergency readmission rates decline after the introduction of a home visits 
program (Hendriksen et al., 1984 for Denmark; Sands et al., 2006 and Xu et al., 2010 for the 
US ; Tomita et al., 2010 for Japan), although other studies find no evidence of this effect 
(Balaam et al., 1988; Fabacher et al., 1994, and Stuck et al., 1995 for the US; Van Rossum et 
al., 1993 for the Netherlands; Pathy et al., 1992 and Hermit et al., 2002 for the UK). 
Receiving informal care decreases the hospital LoS of US Medicare patients following a hip 
fracture, stroke or heart attack (Picone et al., 2003). Weaver and Weaver (2014) find that the 
availability of informal care decreases the average LoS at Swiss hospitals by 1.9 days, 
although it did not affect the probability of hospital admission.  
Another set of studies using a methodology closer to ours draws on quasi-experimental 
data. Rapp et al. (2015) measure the impact of financial assistance for non-medical care on the 
probability of requiring emergency care among patients with Alzheimer’s disease. They 
conclude that the beneficiaries of LTC subsidies have a significantly lower rate of emergency 
care than non-beneficiaries. Holmås et al. (2008) have found that a system of penalties for a 
non-smooth transfer process from hospital to LTC services involved hospital stays that were 
shorter by approximately 2.3 days. However, the withdrawal of the penalties led to hospital 
stays that were three days longer. Our study described below seeks to fill some of the gaps in 
the literature, and as in previous studies it draws upon individual data to study hospital 
admissions (Norton and van Houtven, 2004; Card et al., 2004; Nielsen, 2016; Geil et al., 
1997). 
Finally, some of the literature related to our study examines the effect of 
improvements in integration and care coordination on healthcare use. Health and social care 
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coordination is found to improve an individual’s quality of life (Hofmarcher et al., 2007), but 
without a cost increase (Singh and Ham 2005). However, the effects on hospital admission are 
not always consistent across different programs. We add to this literature by examining a 
unique reform that extends the subsidization of LTC, and hence also provides an exogenous 
variation in the access to affordable LTC.  
3. Background and identification 
3.1 Public Insurance Expansion 
Spain’s ‘Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care of Dependent People’, Law 
39/2006, was passed on December 14, 2006 and enacted in 2007 (we refer to it using its 
Spanish acronym SAAD). The reform was effectively an unexpected expansion of public 
funding (the outcome of a last-minute political agreement by different political groups 
supporting a minority socialist government elected after the 2004 Madrid bombings
4
).  
Before the introduction of SAAD, the provision of LTC was means-tested and funded 
by local authorities. Access to different social services (home care, day centers and nursing 
homes) was conditional upon the score obtained on a rating scale that considered various 
characteristics (age, disability status, income, and family situation). The weights assigned to 
each characteristic were different across regions
5
. In turn, the social security system was 
responsible for some elements of care in the form of cash benefits (major disability benefit, 
third-party benefits, non-contributory invalidity pensions, family benefits for dependent 
children) and social services (re-education and rehabilitation). 
SAAD defined a universal entitlement to LTC under equal conditions for all elderly 
people. The entitlement resulted from the following steps: first, subsidy claimants are subject 
to a ‘needs test’ and classified into one of the three dependency levels (‘moderate’, ‘severe’ or 
‘major’) according to an official ranking scale6. Second, an individual’s care plan is designed 
                                                          
4
 Spain’s LTC reforms were introduced by a government formed by a parliament elected three days after the 
2004 Madrid bombings (Garcia Montalvo, 2011). The new minority socialist government anticipated an 
agreement toward the end of 2006 to implement a tax-funded subsidization of the LTC system. It is therefore 
plausible to assume that the reform was not expected. 
5
IMSERSO (2004). 
6
 The Ranking Scale evaluates 47 tasks grouped into ten activities (eating and drinking, control of physical 
needs, bathing and basic personal care, other personal care, dressing and undressing, maintaining one’s health, 
mobility, moving outside home, and housework). Each task is assigned a different weight, and there is a different 
scale for individuals with mental illness or cognitive disability. Additionally, the evaluation considers the degree 
of supervision required to perform each task. The final score is the sum of the weights of the tasks for which the 
individual has difficulty multiplied by the degree of supervision required. The degree of dependency is 
determined as the result of the sum: not eligible (less than 25 points), moderate dependent (between 25 and 49 
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by regional welfare authorities to determine the services and/or benefits that best meet the 
applicant’s own needs and those of their family. Entitlements include a choice between access 
to subsidized weekly hours of home care
7
 (as well as day and night centers and residential 
services) and a caregiving allowance. Caregiving allowances are designed to compensate 
informal caregivers (including social security contributions) under the following 
circumstances: (i) kinship (up to a third degree of consanguinity), (ii) co-residing with the 
dependent, and (iii) access to suitable housing conditions. The amount of caregiving 
allowances for major dependency ranged between 390€/month and 487€/month in 2007, 
between 417€ and 530€ in 2011 and between 387€ and 442€ in 2013. For severely dependent 
individuals, the cash allowance was set between €180 and €300 in 2011, and between €236 
and €268 in 2013. For the moderately dependent: €153 in 2013. For a better understanding of 
the amount of caregiver and disability allowances, they can be compared with Spain’s 
minimum wage of 570.60 €/month (2007), 641.40 €/month (2011), and 645.30 €/month 
(2013). 
Figure 1 describes SAAD’s implementation (progressive incorporation of less severe 
dependency levels, as well as the amount of caregiving allowances). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
SAAD introduced a tax-funded entitlement to address the needs of older and 
dependent people. Funding was partially provided by the central government and matched by 
regional funds (and individuals are expected to contribute, although they seldom do). 
Regional governments determine the services provided, the conditions and amount of cash 
benefits, the criteria for beneficiaries’ contributions (copayments), and the scale used to assess 
dependency. The latter, together with different political priorities, lead to significant 
heterogeneity both in the initial demographic conditions and in the relative speed of SAAD’s 
implementation (Costa-Font, 2010). Table A1 shows the percentage of population aged 65 
and older by region and year (corresponding to the waves of SHARE), which ranges between 
10-23% of the total population. We then estimate regional heterogeneity through an indicator 
of promptness in individual dependency assessments and the degree of generosity in Table 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
points), severe dependent (between 50 and 74 points), and major dependent (over 74 points). Royal Decree 
504/2007 of April 20 approves the dependency rating scale established by Law 39/2006, of December 14, on the 
promotion of personal autonomy and attention to people in a dependency situation. 
7
 Home care services are provided by professional caregivers, and include those related to household work and 
personal care. Quality standards are defined, and the professional training required to become a home career is 
accredited by regional authorities.  
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A2
8
. We find a high degree of dispersion for both indicators, with a variation of 32-38% to 
100% (see Table A2). We may therefore conclude that there was a wide variation in the 
percentage of the population benefiting from the program (e.g., 3.19% in Andalusia versus 
1.17% per cent in the Canaries, using data for 2010)
9
. Similarly, regions differed in their 
reliance on caregiving subsidies or in-kind benefits
10
.  
Unfortunately, just a year after SAAD was introduced, Spain went into a deep 
economic recession, which led to spending cuts in healthcare, which we control for as 
explained in due course. In addition, the recession increased the country’s public deficit (8.9% 
at the beginning of 2012), and led to a series of spending cuts that included delays in SAAD 
entitlements in July 2012 (Royal Decree 20/2012, July 13, 2012). Specifically, the subsidy for 
‘moderate dependency’ was delayed until 2015; hence, only those with severe and major 
dependency were supported. Among these, support for home care fell from 70–90 
hours/month to 56–70 hours/month for individuals with major dependency, and from 40–55 
hours/month to 31–45 hours/month for those with severe dependency. Finally, caregiving 
allowances were reduced by between 15 and 25%, conditional upon the degree of 
dependency, and the Social Security stopped paying social contributions for informal 
caregivers. 
3.2 Coordination between healthcare and LTC services 
One of the important consequences of the extension of public subsidization (SAAD) 
was the activation of the pre-existing coordination programs between healthcare and LTC 
services. Evidence from Spain provides important insights on the effect of health and social 
care coordination. Traditionally, coordination between health and social care has been limited. 
One of the traditional reasons for such limited coordination is the asymmetric jurisdictional 
functional allocation. Social care has traditionally been a local responsibility, which is subject 
to needs/means testing, while healthcare is run by the regional governments, and is free at the 
point of need, with the exception of pharmaceutical co-payments.  
                                                          
8
 We use official data from the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality to examine the number of 
applications, assessments and people awarded LTC subsidies, and we have computed the ratio between 
assessments and applications and the ratio between people awarded LTC benefits and assessments across 
regions. 
9
 Beneficiaries with respect to the population aged 18 and over. We have used this threshold given the 
differences in the Ranking Scale between the population under and over the age of 18. 
10
 The latter lead to a wide dispersion rate in the cost per dependent (e.g., €5,093 in the Murcia region versus 
€12,715 in the Madrid region), while the percentages of informal caregivers’ benefits with respect to total 
benefits awarded were 68.7% and 18.6%, respectively; Barriga Martí et al. (2015). 
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The other main reason for limited coordination lies in the chronic underfunding of 
social care. Hence, for a reform to exert an influence in the health system it should not only 
coordinate health and social care by making use of different policies, such as a joint 
commissioning mechanism, but also expand the funding of underfunded social care. Table 1 
reports the health and social care coordination plans in several Spanish regions. However, as 
we argue, the benefits of health and social care coordination only materialized when the 
underfunding was corrected.
11
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Based on the above description, our research analyzes the following effects (i) 
SAAD’s implementation on the probability of hospital admission (external margin), the 
number of hospitalizations in the last year (internal margin), as well as total hospital LoS, (ii) 
the health and social care coordination plans in some regions, and (iii) the reduction in the 
subsidy after the 2012 austerity cuts.  
4. Data  
In line with other studies examining hospital care use (Norton and van Houtven, 2004; 
Card et al. 2004; Nielsen, 2016; Geil et al, 1997), we use individual data from the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) for Wave 1 (2004), Wave 2 (2006/2007), 
Wave 4 (2011) and Wave 5 (2013)
12
. Individual survey data are especially important given 
that administrative data often lack the wealth of specific individual control for the 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics available in survey data. SHARE is the 
European equivalent of the Health and Retirement Survey
13
, a panel dataset of interviewees 
born in 1960 or earlier and their partners, covering a number of European countries
14
. 
SHARE
15
 is the most comprehensive dataset available across Europe for examining the 
effects of changes in LTC subsidies among the elderly.  
                                                          
11 For the case of Catalonia, Vargas and Vázquez (2007) have found evidence of a scarcity of coordination 
mechanisms and the preponderance of intra-class efficiency incentives without taking into consideration the 
most cost-effective treatment in the continuum of care. 
12
 Unfortunately, Wave 3 could not be included as it was not comparable with the other waves. 
13
 We have not used data from Wave 6 of SHARE corresponding to 2015 because Royal Decree 20/2012 
determined that individuals qualified as moderately dependent since the entry into fore would have to wait until 
July 2015 to receive any cash or in-kind benefit.  
14
 Countries included: Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Israel, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Ireland. 
15
 SHARE data collection has been funded primarily by the European Commission through FP5 (QLK6-CT-
2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE: CIT5-CT-2005-028857, SHARELIFE: 
CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-PREP: No. 211909, SHARE-LEAP: No. 227822, SHARE M4: No. 
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Using the four waves mentioned before, our initial sample contains 14,854 
observations, but we have discarded observations registering the codes “refusal” or “don`t 
know” for the variables ‘hospitalized in the last 12 months’, ‘number of hospitalizations in the 
last 12 months’, or ‘total number of nights in hospital in the last 12 months¡. Table A3 shows 
the regional distribution of the initial sample and the missing values. The final sample is made 
up of 14,766 observations (2,261 for W1; 2,313 for W2; 3,667 for W4, and 6,525 for W5). 
Table A4 shows the final sample’s regional distribution for each wave.  
4.1 Dependent variables 
We define three dependent variables: 
a) Hospital Admission (extensive margin) (𝐻𝑖) is a variable that takes the value 0 if the 
individual has not spent any nights in hospital over the past twelve months, and is equal to 
1 if he/she has. It includes stays due to surgery, medical tests, or non-surgical treatments 
and mental health problems. Hospital admissions do not therefore include stays in LTC 
facilities or nursing homes. 
b) Hospital Utilization (intensive margin) (𝐻𝑁𝑖) is a count variable taking the value 0 if the 
individual has not been admitted to hospital over the past twelve months, and a positive 
value equal to the number of times he/she has been admitted over the past year. Given that 
the Spanish LTC reform was first introduced in 2007, and hospital admissions are 
recorded over the twelve months prior to the survey, admissions coded in the 2007 wave 
may have actually taken place in 2006. To capture the reform’s true effect on hospital 
admissions, we will assume that the pre-reform period covers Waves 1 and 2 (2004, 2006, 
2007),
16
 and the post-reform period covers Waves 4 and 5 (2011 and 2013).  
c) Hospital Length of Stay (𝐻𝐿𝑜𝑆𝑖) is a count variable taking the value 0 if the individual has 
not spent a single night in hospital over the past twelve months, and a positive value equal 
to the number of nights he/she has spent in a hospital over the past year (counting all 
hospital admissions in the last twelve months).  
4.2 Explanatory variables 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
261982). Additional funding has been provided by the German Ministry of Education and Research, the U.S. 
National Institute on Aging (U01_AG09740-13S2, P01_AG005842, P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, 
R21_AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG_BSR06-11, OGHA_04-064), and from various national funding sources 
(see www.share-project.org). 
16
 For 2007, the interviews were made at the beginning of the year, as they correspond to the 2006-2007 wave. 
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The SHARE questionnaire contains information on the respondents’ main socio-
demographic characteristics that are often not available in many observational studies, such as 
age, gender, level of education, marital status, self-reported health status, Katz Index
17
, net 
income (€2011), and net wealth (€2011) (Van Rossum et al., 1993; Rapp et al., 2015). Before 
SAAD, individuals receiving a caregiving subsidy were identified through the SHARE 
questionnaire as those belonging to one of the following groups: permanent disability benefit, 
third-party benefits, non-contributory invalidity pensions or family benefits for dependent 
children. After 2007, SAAD can only be accessed by either (i) individuals that were not 
previously receiving any type of benefit (permanent disability benefit, third-party benefits, 
non-contributory invalidity pensions, family benefits for dependent children), who started the 
application process and were evaluated according to SAAD’s Official Ranking Scale; or (ii) 
individuals already receiving any one of the benefits listed in the previous point, who were re-
evaluated according to the Ranking Scale, and re-classified as a moderate, severe or major 
dependent. Although the law guarantees that the Ranking Scale is valid throughout Spain, the 
test is carried out by officers working for the region where the applicant resides to determine 
the services or benefits that best meet the applicant’s needs. This means there is significant 
regional variability, in addition to other differences in the reform’s actual implementation.  
We define two binary variables: 𝐶𝐵𝑖 takes the value 1 if the beneficiary receives a 
caregiving allowance, and zero otherwise. The allowance is paid to the dependent individual 
to compensate the informal caregiver. 𝐻𝐵𝑖 takes the value 1 if the beneficiary receives public 
home care benefit, and zero otherwise. Caregiving allowance and home care benefits are 
mutually exclusive. 
Coordination programs between healthcare and LTC services were heterogeneous 
across regions. Some regions implemented health and social care coordination plans both 
before and during the period of analysis. We define a binary variable (𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑) that takes the 
                                                          
17
 The Katz Index is not directly provided by SHARE, but has been obtained using data on disabilities for 
DLAs, following Katz (1983). The dependency degree is approximated using the Katz Index (Katz, 1983). The 
Katz Index determines functional status as a measurement of the ability to perform six daily living activities 
independently. We have computed this index using the information on DLAs provided by SHARE. Respondents 
have been classified into four categories: Katz0 indicates that the individual performs all activities 
independently; Katz1 indicates that the individual performs four or five activities independently (which could be 
identified as a moderate degree of dependency); Katz2 indicates that the individual only performs two or three 
activities independently (severe dependency); Katz3 indicates that the individual needs help for all activities (or 
all but one), and should therefore be considered a major dependent.  
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value 1 if the coordination program is in place in the region at the time of the survey (see 
Table 1 for a description of the regions with coordination programs). 
Given that hospital deployment might be explained by resource constraints and 
demand pressures in the health sector rather than LTC subsidization, we control for hospital 
infection rates, the number of public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, the degree of 
satisfaction with public healthcare, per capita public health expenditure (€2011), and the rate 
of medical complications in hospitals. 
4.3 Imputation of public home care for Wave 4 
Our data contain records of caregiving allowances and support received from public 
home care services for Waves 1, 2 and 5. However, Wave 4’s records contain data solely on 
the caregiving allowance, as questions concerning public home care were omitted from the 
questionnaire. However, given that we identify the individual-level information from previous 
waves, a multiple imputation procedure has been used to deal with missing data (Rubin, 
1987). This technique allows predicting what the random missing values would have been 
using information from the whole dataset (Waves 1, 2, 4 and 5)
18
. It requires two main 
assumptions: (i) the data must be missing at random, which is clearly the case because 
observations for public home care are missing for all the individuals in Wave 4, and (ii) the 
reasons for the missing data must be captured by other variables that do not have missing 
values.  
As the missing variable is binary, a logistic imputation method has been chosen, and 
the following explanatory
19
 variables have been introduced: age, gender, being married, 
having co-resident children, pathologies (stroke, mental illness, Parkinson’s, hip fracture), and 
a left-wing regional government. To test the sensitivity of our results, we have selected five 
different random seed values, and added five different imputations to our main dataset. The 
results in these alternative cases were very similar to the original estimations. 
                                                          
18
 Kalton (1986) and Lepkowski (1989) review methods for compensating for wave non-response, and 
recommend cross-wave imputation if there are data from multiple waves. 
19
 We have not used `receiving home care in the previous wave’ as an explanatory variable due to the relatively 
low retention rate between waves. Only around 60% of the individuals interviewed in one wave continue in the 
next one (see footnote 37 for more details). Although we do not use the panel information for imputation, we can 
use the panel structure to obtain an approximate goodness-of-fit measure for the imputation procedure. We find 
that 88% of those receiving home care benefits in 2006/2007 that are present in the 2011 wave are identified by 
the imputation procedure. 
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We assess the reliability of our imputations by drawing upon official data published by 
the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality
20
. Table A5 shows that the number of 
home care benefits awarded in June 2011 amounted to 110,586. Two important caveats 
should be mentioned before comparing these figures with our imputations. First, no official 
data disaggregated by age and type of benefit are available. We only know that 85.78% of 
beneficiaries are aged 46 and over
21
, and we unaware of the number of beneficiaries aged 50 
and over receiving public home care. Second, the quality of official data published by the 
Ministry is conditioned by the reports submitted by the departments of social services in each 
region or autonomous community, which might explain why some regions do not seem to 
have awarded any home care benefit. The imputation procedure assigned 180 home care 
benefits in 2011. Using the calibrated weights provided by SHARE, we find that 103,732 
individuals were receiving home care benefit at population level. This means a difference of 
6,584 fewer individuals than in the official data. However, based on previous considerations, 
we assume our imputations to be fairly reliable.  
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table A6 provides a comparison between data from SHARE and from the National Health 
Survey (NHS) for Spain. We have used waves corresponding to 2003, 2006 and 2011 as a 
comparison method with SHARE data for Waves 1 (2004), 2 (2006/07) and 4 (2011). 
Unfortunately, the Spanish Institute of Statistics has not recorded any more NHS waves after 
2011, and we cannot perform the comparison for Wave 5 of SHARE. Table A5 compares 
regional data for the percentage of hospitalizations and their number in the last year. The NHS 
only reports hospital LoS, whereas SHARE registers the LoS of all hospitalizations recorded 
in the last year. This means it has not been possible to compare both variables. In spite of 
these limitations, we observe a close similarity between both surveys for the percentage of 
hospitalizations and their number. 
Table A7 in the Appendix provides the descriptive statistics for the number of hospital 
admissions and hospital LoS. We identify 1,254 out of 14,766 observations corresponding to 
beneficiaries of LTC benefits, with 751 of those received caregiving allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) and 
                                                          
20
 http://www.dependencia.imserso.gob.es/dependencia_01/documentacion/estadisticas/est_inf/inf_gp/index.htm 
21
 The age interval starts at 46 (and not at 50) because it is the only disaggregation available on the web page. 
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503 receiving home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖). Furthermore, 355 of them (as well as 1,034 non-
beneficiaries) have been hospitalized.
22
 
It is noticeable in almost all the cases that the standard deviation exceeds the mean, 
which is a clear indication of data overdispersion. Between Waves 1&2 and Wave 4, hospital 
LoS has decreased both among those receiving caregiving allowances (from 11.35 to 8.75) 
and home care (from 15.36 to 11.54). However, and importantly, we find that the previous 
reduction in hospital LoS partially disappeared between the last two waves, especially among 
those receiving caregiving allowances (from 8.75 in W4 to 12.09 in W5). Similar conclusions 
are obtained from the analysis for the number of hospital admissions. 
A core assumption of the difference-in-differences strategy we use to identify the model’s 
key parameters is that the time trend is common to both groups. Hence, both treatment and 
control individuals are expected to record hospital admissions that are the same as without the 
LTC reform, after controlling for observables. Although this common time trend assumption 
is not directly testable, it is very plausible in our context based on existing comparable pre-
trends. Since no other LTC legislation was passed after 2007,  we would a priori expect to see 
a change in the percentage of hospital admissions for the treatment group in the reform year, 
with like-for-like time trends in subsequent years. This is indeed what we find. 
Figure 2 shows the trends in the external margin of our dependent variable, that is, the 
percentage of hospital admissions by type of LTC support received. Importantly, after 2007 
we observe a reduction in the frequency of hospital admissions among both beneficiaries of 
caregiving allowances and home care, but not among those who do not receive any benefits. 
Consistently, in 2013, and possibly due to the effect of the austerity cuts in 2012, some of 
these benefits were reversed. However, a number of other misleading effects need to be 
controlled for in these trends, and we do so in our econometric analysis below.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 shows the density function for hospital LoS distinguishing those benefitting 
from SAAD and those not doing so at the time of the survey. It is noticeable that SAAD 
                                                          
22
 Regarding the number of observations, Forster et al. (2003) have analyzed the incidence of injuries after 
hospital discharge using a survey of 400 respondents interviewed by telephone, and Seymour and Pringle (1982) 
have studied the incidence of postoperative morbidity and other socioeconomic and administrative factors using 
a sample of 1,590 individuals aged 65 and over. Finally, Geil et al. (1997) have analyzed hospital admissions in 
Germany with a comparable number of observations for general and chronic condition subsamples. Additionally, 
Schwartz and Giles (2016) have shown that the maximum likelihood estimation of the zero-inflated Poisson 
model has very little bias, even in relatively small samples. 
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beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries follow opposite patterns. We find a decrease in LoS 
among beneficiaries between 2004/07 and 2011. In contrast, we find a shift to the right among 
non-beneficiaries. Consistently, between 2011 and 2013 the density functions for both groups 
partially reverse the displacements observed in the previous sub-period (e.g., a higher 
concentration of a lower LoS for non-beneficiaries, but an increase for beneficiaries).  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Table A8 provides a detailed table of descriptive statistics for individual explanatory 
variables. Individuals receiving home care benefits are on average 10 years older than the 
beneficiaries of caregiving allowances. They also record a higher concentration of women, 
and widowed or more dependent individuals. Regardless of beneficiary status, all the groups 
have seen a sharp decrease in their real net income and real net wealth between both sub-
periods.  
Table A9 reveals that public health expenditure and the degree of satisfaction with the 
public healthcare system peaked in 2011. This is a direct effect of the austerity cuts resulting 
from Royal Decree-Law 16/2012
23
. Second, the number of resources and the quality of care 
received at hospitals is proxied by the hospital infection rate and complications rate
24
, as well 
as by the number of public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. We note an increase in the 
infection rate at hospitals in the last two waves, and a progressive rise in the number of 
hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants in publicly owned hospitals during the period. Finally, the 
rate of hospital complications has increased sharply in the last two waves. 
5. Empirical Strategy  
5.1. The count nature of hospital admissions  
Given the discrete nature of both the number of hospital admissions and hospital LoS 
(dependent variables do not have negative values), a linear model is likely to distort the count 
data generating process, and may lead to negative or non-integer predictions (King, 1988). 
Although the Poisson specification is the natural candidate for these processes, it might be too 
restrictive if the variance of the data exceeds its mean (overdispersion). A common alternative 
                                                          
23 Royal Decree-Law 16/2012, of April 20, described urgent measures to guarantee the sustainability of the 
National Health System, aimed at improving the quality and assurance of care. It changed entitlement to the 
healthcare system from one based on residence to another based on contributions, and increased the patient cost-
sharing of prescribed medicines (see more details in Gené-Badia et al., (2012); Legido-Quigley et al. (2013)). 
24
 The infection and complications rates are considered by the AHRQ (2007) and the ECHI (2013) as quality 
indicators of healthcare services.  
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to the Poisson model is the negative binomial model. However, even though the negative 
binomial solves the problem of overdispersion, neither of them provides a suitable fit if there 
is a large percentage of zero observations in the dataset.  
The approaches normally used in the empirical literature include zero-inflated and 
double-hurdle specifications. The zero-inflated model is sensitive to the fact that zeros may 
arise in two circumstances; that is, either as a consequence of a strategic decision, or due to 
incidental reasons (Winkelmann, 2008). Some individuals may report zero hospital 
admissions because they have not suffered a serious enough health shock to require admission 
to a hospital. These individuals may be referred to as ‘strategic non-hospitalized’. On the 
other hand, an individual requiring hospitalization, but not admitted, would qualify as an 
‘incidental zero observation’.25  
Our preferred alternative is the double-hurdle model, also referred to as the two-part 
model. The double-hurdle model assumes that ‘the zeros’ are only the result of strategic 
decisions, and are hence generated by a mechanism separated from that of non-zeros 
(Mullahy, 1986; Gurmu, 1998). The first hurdle determines whether the count variable is zero 
or has a positive realization (i.e., if the individual has been hospitalized at least once in the 
past 12 months). A positive value indicates that the first hurdle is overcome, and in this case 
the number of hospital admissions over the last 12 months and the hospital LoS for all 
hospitalizations (intensive margin) are modelled using a truncated distribution. Both stages 
are independent, and the first hurdle is usually modelled as a logit distribution, and the second 
hurdle as a zero-truncated negative binomial or a Poisson (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).
26
 Our 
baseline specification relies on  does rely on a pooled dataset to avoid a significant reduction 
                                                          
25
 Given the nature of the Spanish health system, this situation seems highly improbable in principle. SHARE 
only provides information on unmet hospitalisation needs for Wave 1: 0.29% (0.33%) of respondents reported 
not having received surgery or hospital treatment because they could not afford it (it was not available). 
26
 The truncated Poisson allows us to solve the overdispersion problem of the simple Poisson model:  
𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ Ω + 𝑖𝑐𝑡 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡|Ω] =  𝐸[𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡|Ω] + 𝐸[𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡|Ω] (𝑒
𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ Ω − 𝐸[𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡|Ω])  
𝐸[𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡|Ω] =
𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ Ω
1 + 𝑒𝑒
−𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ Ω
∗
𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ Ω
1 − 𝑒𝑒
−𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ Ω
 
 
Where 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 denotes our model’s dependent variable (number of hospital admissions over the last year, LoS of 
individual i living in region c in year t), 𝑊𝑖𝑡
′  includes all the regressors and𝑖𝑐𝑡  is the residual term. Depending on 
𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ Ω and 𝐸[𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡|Ω], the mean may be higher or lower than the variance, and so it can accommodate situations 
of overdispersion and underdispersion.  
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in the number of observations (from 14,766 to 5,647 in the case of panel data). However, we 
provide panel data estimates for comparative purposes in section 6.2. 
 
5.2 The empirical specification of the double-hurdle model 
Regarding the specification of the hurdle model, it must answer two questions. First, 
how could one best identify the way SAAD has affected hospital variables in both the internal 
and external margin? Second, how should the estimation itself be specified, and more 
specifically, how should a two-part model be defined in the presence of potentially 
endogenous covariates? We address the first issue in this subsection, while the second one 
will be discussed in the following subsection. 
To address the first issue, that is, SAAD’s effect on hospital admission (at both the 
intensive and extensive margin) and LoS, we use a difference-in-differences specification. 
This approach has been widely used to measure the effect of a new policy or to analyze the 
impact of policy changes (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986; Wooldridge, 2002). The difference-in-
differences method is a standard policy evaluation tool that assesses the effect a policy 
intervention has on a treatment group compared to a control group once this specific policy 
has been implemented. As our data do not come from a real experiment, the assignment to 
treatment and control is based on the evidence provided by SHARE. In our model, 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 is 
a binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for individuals 
receiving LTC benefits (either caregiving allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑐𝑡) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖𝑐𝑡)). 
The control group is therefore made up of individuals that were not receiving any type of 
benefit when the survey was conducted. As regards the second issue, the estimation of the 
double-hurdle model faces two important challenges, namely, model specification and the 
existence of potentially endogenous variables. Let us first describe the specification. 
The first hurdle determines whether the count variable is zero or has a positive 
realization, that is, if individual i living in region c has been hospitalized at least once in the 
past 12 months (𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 1). It may be expressed as the following difference-in-differences 
regression for the probability of a hospital admission: 
𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 =
𝐹(𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛼1 + 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡𝛼3 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 𝛼4 +
+𝐻𝐶𝑐𝑡
′ 𝛼5 + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡)
       (1) 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 = {𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑐𝑡 or 𝐻𝐵𝑖𝑐𝑡} 
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where F denotes a probability function, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is a binary variable taking the value one for 
Waves 4 and 5, and the value zero for Waves 1 and 2, 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 refers to the individual 
characteristics (age, gender, marital status, level of education, self-reported health status, and 
dependency degree approximated by the Katz Index), and 𝐻𝐶𝑐𝑡 denotes the characteristics of 
the regional healthcare sector (public health expenditure per capita in real terms, number of 
public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, infection rate at hospitals
27
, and satisfaction with 
the public healthcare system). In addition, 𝐶𝑐 and 𝑇𝑡 denote regional and temporal dummy 
variables, respectively, and 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a random error term that also captures individual 
unobserved characteristics.  
The coefficient of 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡, 𝛼3, captures the reform’s impact. It evaluates 
whether receiving a benefit after the reform has any differential effect on the probability of 
hospital admission with respect to the pre-reform period. Although the reform was introduced 
nationwide, the speed of the introduction varied widely across regions, so identifying the 
reform’s impact implicitly stems from (it is reinforced by) its regional variation.  
When the first hurdle is met, that is, when 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 1, the second hurdle (or count 
variable), 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡
∗  (either hospital LoS, 𝐻𝐿𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡, or the exact number of hospital admissions, 
𝐻𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑡), is modelled using a truncated Poisson distribution
28
.  
𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡
∗ =
𝐺(𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡1 + 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡2 + 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡3 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 
4
+
+𝐻𝐶𝑐𝑡5 + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑖𝑐𝑡) if 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 1
       (2) 
𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡
∗ = {𝐻𝐿𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝐻𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑡} 
where G denotes a truncated count specification, and 𝑖𝑐𝑡 is an error term assumed to be 
independent of the first-stage error. The coefficient of 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝛽3, evaluates 
whether receiving a benefit after the reform has any differential effect on the number of 
hospital admissions or hospital LoS compared to the pre-reform period. 
                                                          
27
 We have also estimated the model by substituting the infection rate and number of public hospital beds by the 
rate of medical complications at hospital. The complete set of results is available upon request. 
28 A statistical exploration of the data has led us to consider a logit plus zero-truncated Poisson (double-hurdle) 
model to solve the overdispersion problem mentioned earlier. The results (available from the authors upon 
request) point to the same conclusions for the three types of benefits. First, the significance of the overdispersion 
parameter (alpha) and the comparison of the AIC and BIC statistics for the Poisson and negative binomial 
models indicate that the negative binomial model fits the data better. Second, the likelihood ratio test between 
the Poisson and the hurdle Poisson confirms the suitability of a double-hurdle model. Third, the likelihood ratio 
test between the negative binomial and the hurdle negative binomial rejects the former. Finally, a comparison 
between both hurdle models rejects the hurdle negative binomial.  
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Using maximum likelihood to estimate equations (1) and (2) provides consistent and 
efficient estimations if 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷 and 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡
′  are exogenous. However, when the unobserved 
determinants of 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 are correlated with 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 or 𝑖𝑐𝑡, the estimated coefficients are biased. 
We draw from estimates of a pool sample; panel data estimates are nonetheless provided in 
section 6.2.  
 
5.3 Dealing with the endogeneity of SAAD variables 
As noted above, one of the threats to our empirical strategy is the potential 
endogeneity of SAAD. For example, SAAD has been implemented at a different pace in each 
region, and some regions may have a significantly higher propensity to award cash benefits, 
whereas others are more prone to set up a network of home care services. As a result, the error 
term of (1) or (2) could be correlated with unobservable variables that affect the 
implementation of SAAD. Hence, assuming that SAAD is exogenous in (1) or (2) may lead to 
inconsistent estimates of the model’s key parameters.  
Given the difference-in-differences specification used, we have two potential 
endogenous variables: 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 and 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗  𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡. We therefore propose using a control 
function (CF) approach to account for their potential endogeneity. This technique, suggested 
by both Wooldridge (2002) and Blundell and Powell (2003), is useful for estimating non-
linear models
29
. In a first stage, we run a linear regression of the endogenous variables on all 
exogenous variables and instruments, and obtain the residuals.  
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 = Z𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 2 + 𝐻𝐶𝑐𝑡
′ 3 + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑐𝑡   (3) 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 = Z𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 𝜗1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 𝜗2 + 𝐻𝐶𝑐𝑡
′ 𝜗3 + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜍𝑖𝑐𝑡  (4) 
where 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 is either 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑐𝑡 (caregiving allowances) or 𝐻𝐵𝑖𝑐𝑡 (home benefits), Z𝑖𝑐𝑡
′  is a 
vector of instruments, and 𝜉𝑖𝑐𝑡 and 𝜍𝑖𝑐𝑡 are residuals distributed according to N(0,1). We 
obtain the first-stage residuals (?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑖𝑐𝑡 and ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑖𝑐𝑡) and, in a second stage, we use 
them as additional control variables in both hurdles. We use bootstrapping to obtain valid 
standard errors. The final difference-in-differences double-hurdle model controlling by the 
potential endogeneity of the LTC variables is given by the following equations: 
                                                          
29
 Terza et al. (2008) contend that two-stage least squares estimation may lead to inconsistent estimates, and so 
the residual inclusion estimation is the preferred approach in non-linear settings.  
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𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 =
𝐹(𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛼1 + 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡𝛼3 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 𝛼4 +
+𝐻𝐶𝑐𝑡
′ 𝛼5 + ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛼6 + ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛼7 + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡
∗ )
       (5) 
𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡
∗ =
𝐺(𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡𝛽3 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ 𝛽4 +
+𝐻𝐶𝑐𝑡𝛽5 + ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛽6 + ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛽7 + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡
∗ )
      (6) 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡 = {𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑐𝑡 or 𝐻𝐵𝑖𝑐𝑡 }, 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡
∗ = {𝐻𝐿𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝐻𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑡} 
Implementing a significance test on the joint effect of ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑖𝑐𝑡and ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑖𝑐𝑡 
provides a simple way to test the assumption that SAAD and SAAD*POST are exogenous in 
the first and second hurdles, respectively. If the effect of ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑖𝑐𝑡 or ?̂?𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷_𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑖𝑐𝑡 is 
significant in one or both equations, we can reject the exogeneity of SAAD or SAAD * POST 
in the corresponding equation
30
. 
Regarding the vector of instruments (Z𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ ), we have considered six different ones. The 
first one refers to the percentage of support for the socialist party in the last general elections 
(𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡), as the socialist party’s manifesto included the development and implementation of a 
new LTC legislation
31
 (see Table B1). Specifically, given that the reform was the ‘star social 
program’ of a newly elected government, and that the regions were co-financing and 
implementing the reform, political support for the incumbent party at regional level would be 
expected to make it easier for the regional government to implement. We take advantage of 
the fact that in Wave 2 we can distinguish between interviews carried out in 2006 and 2007 to 
assign more exactly the value of the instrumental variable `percentage of socialist vote’ to 
each observation. The instrument is both theoretically relevant and empirically significant, 
and after running further analyses we find no reason to believe it impacts on the dependent 
variable in any other way but through the reform
32
. The second instrument we use refers to the 
                                                          
30
 We have also estimated the model including both types of benefits (caregiving allowances and home care 
benefits) in the same equation, as well as their interactions with the post-reform dummy. This implies that the 
number of endogenous variables increases from two to four, and so we must include four residual variables in 
the second-step equations. As Phillips (1983) has shown, an increase in the number of endogenous variables 
reduces the danger of omitted variable bias, but also reduces the reliability of estimations because the 
observation-to-parameter ratio becomes smaller. In view of this and the fact that the number of reliable 
instruments is limited, we have preferred to estimate the effect each type of benefit has separately. 
31
 Regions governed by the socialist party would be expected to speed up the implementation of the reform, as 
some previous research has documented (Costa-Font, 2010). 
32
 According to Bacigalupe et al. (2016), there is no evidence of a link between socialist support in a region and a 
higher investment in public healthcare services, or vice versa, a positive relationship between conservative 
regions and privatizations of public hospitals (i.e., Andalusia and Extremadura, which are regions with left-wing 
governments, have experienced a major decrease in healthcare resources between 2008 and 2013 and a moderate 
increase (Andalusia) or big increase (Extremadura) in privatizations. By contrast, Murcia, which has a right-wing 
government, has recorded a moderate reduction in public healthcare resources and a decrease in privatized 
facilities).  
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interaction between the percentage of the vote for the socialist party and the post-reform 
period (𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡 ∗  𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇).  
In addition, we include the coverage index of public home care in 2002 and 2000, 
before the onset of SAAD, to capture the effect of regional differences in the provision of 
formal care (see Table B2). The fifth instrument we apply refers to the proportion of women 
outside the labor market, which can be interpreted as a measure of the propensity to provide 
informal care. Finally, we define a binary variable if the individual lives in a rural area, and 
zero otherwise. This variable controls for formal care availability and the willingness to apply 
for formal care in rural areas compared to cities
33
. 
Validity of the instruments. The results of the first-stage regressions confirm the 
validity of our instruments. Regions with higher socialist support have a lower propensity to 
award a caregiving allowance, but a significant and positive tendency to develop a network of 
home care support (Table 2). Given that we control for regional fixed effects, we conclude 
that the differential speeds in SAAD’s implementation were influenced by political support 
for the regional incumbent. The coverage index of public home care in 2000 and 2002 shows 
a negative association with the probability of receiving a caregiver allowance and a counter 
effect on home care. By contrast, a higher fraction of women out of the labor force, or a larger 
fraction of the population living in a rural area are associated with a higher probability of 
receiving a caregiver allowance, but a lower probability of receiving home care support. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
5.4. Coordination and spending cuts 
In addition to obtaining the average effect of SAAD on hospital admissions, we are 
interested in two additional specification exercises, namely, the effect of coordination plans 
and the effect of the budget cuts introduced in 2012/2013. We model them by introducing a 
triple interaction effect in the specification of both hurdles (SAAD*POST*COORD), which 
can be interpreted as both the effect of coordination and the effect of SAAD. 
 In the case of budget cuts, we take advantage of the fact that the final wave of 
SHARE in our analysis refers to a date subsequent to their introduction. Consequently, the 
triple interaction, SAAD*POST*2013 identifies the effect of the spending cuts in 2012. This 
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 Moreno-Colom et al. (2016) state that socio-cultural factors play an important role in the increase in the 
number of professional formal care providers. These socio-cultural factors, which are much stronger in rural 
settings, help to explain why the family continues to provide the main group of care providers in the countryside. 
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term’s coefficient can be interpreted as the additional effect of the budget cuts on top of the 
reform’s 2011 effects.  
6. Results 
6.1. The reform’s effect on hospital admissions  
In keeping with previous results, we find evidence of a reduction in hospital 
admissions (HAs) among those exposed to SAAD. Table 3 reports the results for the key 
coefficients of the Poisson hurdle model: the probability of an HA (external margin), the 
number of HAs (internal margin), and the LoS resulting from the introduction of SAAD, both 
for individuals benefiting from a caregiving allowance and those receiving home care (all the 
other coefficients are presented for the baseline case in Table C2). Specifically, panel A 
reports the baseline case for these effects; panel B presents the coordination case emphasizing 
the effects for those regions that have implemented coordination programs between healthcare 
and social care, and finally, panel C presents the analysis of the effect of budgetary cuts 
implemented in SAAD in 2013. The first-stage residuals are not significant in the first hurdle 
(logit), but they are in the second one (truncated Poisson). The Hausman test rejects the 
hypothesis of endogeneity of SAAD and SAAD * POST in the first hurdle, but accepts it for 
the second one. However, we keep and present the Instrumental Variable (IV) specification 
for both hurdles
34
. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Baseline results. Panel A in Table 3 reports the model’s baseline results, with the 
treatment variable after the reform captured by the interaction SAAD*POST. Our results 
indicate that, as expected, the reform did indeed reduce HAs in both the internal and external 
margin, as well as its LoS. Firstly, the probability of HA decreased by 9.5 pp among those 
receiving caregiving allowances compared to similar beneficiaries in the pre-reform period, 
but it is not significant for home care beneficiaries. Second, the effect size for the number of 
hospital admissions and LOS is different for caregiving allowances and home care. Although 
the coefficient for home care had a greater impact on the LoS, the coefficient of those 
receiving a caregiving allowance was larger on the number of hospital admissions. Our effect 
sizes indicate that the LoS for beneficiaries of caregiving allowances (home care 
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 Table C1 in the Appendix shows the results for the hurdle Poisson model without the control function. Not 
controlling for the endogeneity of LTC benefits (caregiving allowances and home care benefits) leads to an 
overestimation of their effects over the number of hospital admissions and hospital LoS for the coordination case 
and the analysis of budgetary cuts.  
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beneficiaries) is 0.79 (0.70) times shorter than that of similar beneficiaries in the pre-reform 
period. The beneficiaries of caregiving allowances record an increase in the number of HAs 
(1.13 times more than non-beneficiaries).  
Among those receiving home care, we observe that the probability of HA increases by 
5.2 pp, and LoS is 1.26 times higher than that of non-home care beneficiaries. The interaction 
term (SAAD*POST) indicates that the number of hospital admissions in the post-reform 
period is 0.90 (0.70) times that of a home care beneficiary in the pre-reform period.
35
 We may 
therefore conclude that individuals receiving a caregiving allowance recorded a higher 
reduction in the number of HAs, and that those receiving support for home care record a 
bigger decrease in the average LoS. 
When we examine the effect of all the other controls (see Table C2 in the Appendix 
for the detailed results of the analysis), we find that the number of public beds per 1,000 
inhabitants does not affect HA in either the internal or external margin. A higher infection rate 
is negatively correlated with the number of HAs and hospital LoS, whilst higher satisfaction 
with the public healthcare system is only negatively correlated with hospital LoS. In contrast, 
higher public healthcare expenditure is positively correlated with hospital LoS
36
.  
The role of care coordination. Panel B in Table 3 reports the combined effect of 
coordination
37
, receiving LTC benefits, and the LTC reform.  
The fact that the variable `coordination’ is not significant in the pre-reform period 
might indicate that the chronic underfunding of LTC services does not allow coordination to 
deliver its expected effects. The interaction term SAAD*Coordination indicates that (i) the 
number of HAs for beneficiaries of caregiving allowances in coordinated regions is 1.33 times 
higher than similar beneficiaries in non-coordinated regions, (ii) the LoS of home care 
beneficiaries in coordinated regions is 1.42 times that of similar beneficiaries in non-
coordinated regions.  
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 We have re-estimated the model removing the infection rate and number of public bed hospitals. Instead, we 
have introduced the complications rate as regards total discharges. The results of the hurdle Poisson model are 
robust to this change in explanatory variables. [Results available upon request] 
36
 The decrease of €154 (2011) between 2012 and 2013 is therefore associated with an increase in the number of 
hospitalizations (0.31 for cash benefits, 0.29 for home care) and a very a negligible reduction in LoS (0.08 for 
cash benefits, 0.05 for home care).  
37
 In addition, care coordination may entail a wide range of healthcare services, such as psychogeriatric, long-
stay, rehabilitation, and palliative care, which have not been considered in this paper (IMSERSO, 2011). 
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The LTC reform has nonetheless been well-received in regions with coordination 
programs. The probability of HA for beneficiaries has declined compared to the pre-reform 
period in coordinated regions (11.6 pp. for caregiving allowances, 18.5 pp. for home care 
benefits). Additionally, the number of HAs in coordinated regions is lower than in the pre-
reform period (0.86 times lower for caregiving allowances, 0.79 for home care benefits). The 
LoS for beneficiaries of home care benefits is 0.66 times lower compared to the pre-reform 
period. 
Nonetheless, the coefficient of the triple interaction SAAD*Coord*POST paints a 
different picture. First, the probability of an HA falls by 11.6 pp. among those benefitting 
from a caregiving allowance, and by 18.5 pp for home care in regions with coordination 
programs between healthcare and LTC services. We do not find a significant effect of 
caregiving allowance on hospital LoS, suggesting that coordination effects only reduce LoS 
among those receiving home care. These results are consistent with previous findings 
whereby coordination programs were a breeding-ground for the implementation of the reform 
(SAAD), insofar as they deliver a reduction in the number of HAs and in hospital LoS in the 
post-reform period. The negative and significant sign of the SAAD*Coord*POST in the post-
reform period reveals that SAAD may be interpreted as the formation of links between 
informal caregivers and healthcare professionals in regions with coordination programs. The 
results suggest that informal caregivers had not been considered part of the organizational 
models before SAAD. 
Overall, the average hospital LoS of patients receiving home care in regions with 
coordination programs after the reform is 0.67 shorter than that of other patients receiving 
home care in a region without a coordination program. The number of HAs has been reduced 
by 0.86 (0.79) among those receiving a caregiving allowance (home care beneficiaries) in 
regions with coordination programs after the reform, as compared to the rest. As in the 
baseline case, the residuals corresponding to the first-stage regression for the four endogenous 
variables are significant in the second hurdle, but not in the first one.  
The effect of the 2012/2013 budgetary cuts. Finally, panel C in Table 3 shows the 
effects of the austerity cuts introduced between 2012 and 2013. The interaction term 
SAAD*POST (2011&2013) indicates that the LoS for receivers of a caregiving allowance 
(home care) is 0.86 (0.87) times lower than that of similar beneficiaries in the pre-reform 
period. Nevertheless, these reductions in HA have been partially compensated by the opposite 
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sign effects observed for SAAD* POST*YEAR (2013), affecting both the LoS and the number 
of HAs, but not the external marginal of an HA consistent with a bed-blocking effect. In fact, 
we find that the expected LoS of those receiving a caregiving allowance (home care) in 2013 
is 1.29 (1.48) longer than that of similar beneficiaries before that year. Finally, we also find 
that budgetary cuts have had a significant effect on the external marginal of an HA, 
particularly for those hospitalized at least once in the last year, where we observe a significant 
increase in the number of admissions (1.16 HAs/year for caregiving allowances; 1.40 
HAs/year for home care beneficiaries). 
6.2. Robustness check: panel data estimates 
Thus far, we have made no assumptions on the individual effects, treating them as 
nuisance parameters, and we have not exploited the panel nature of the survey to avoid a 
significant reduction in the sample that may eventually be less representative.
38
 However, 
after imposing the strict exogeneity of the model’s covariates, we check the robustness of the 
result by extending equations (1) and (2), allowing for specific individual effects to estimate a 
fixed effects logit model
39
 (see Wooldridge, 2010) and a fixed effect truncated Poisson
40
 
(Majo and Vas Soest, 2011) to examine admission and utilization, respectively (see Table 
C3). For home care beneficiaries, the interaction term (SAAD*POST) indicates that the 
number of hospital admissions (LoS between brackets) in the post-reform period is 0.79 
(0.62) times that of a home care beneficiary in the pre-reform period. These effects are 
therefore stronger than those obtained for the cross-section model (0.90 and 0.70, 
respectively). Concerning individuals receiving a caregiving allowance, we obtain a similar 
result: panel data estimations show that the interaction term for the number of HAs (LOS) is 
0.71 (0.70) times lower compared to a beneficiary in the pre-reform period, whereas the 
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 More specifically, the sample falls from 14,766 to 5,647, associated with a lower retention of households or 
individuals that completed one wave conditional upon having answered the previous wave. Sample sizes for 
Waves 1 and 2 were 2,396 and 2,228, respectively. However, only 1,375 individuals participated in both waves 
(a retention rate of 61.7% http://www.share-project.org/data-documentation/sample.html). As regards Wave 4, 
the percentage participating in previous waves is also around 60% (Malter and Börsch-Supan, 2013). 
39
 As Wooldridge (2010) has noted, the fixed effects logit estimator has the advantage of being consistent 
regardless of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity or its relationship with other explanatory variables. 
The fixed effects logit model is therefore estimated by considering unobserved heterogeneity as a nuisance 
parameter, and using the standard conditional maximum likelihood estimator (Chamberlain, 1980). 
40 The estimation by conditional maximum likelihood of the fixed effects truncated Poisson model is consistent, 
and provides several advantages over other alternatives. First, it does not require the specification of the 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneities and their relationships with the explanatory variables, as in the fixed 
effects zero-inflated Poisson model. Second, estimations of the random effects zero-inflated Poisson model are 
not robust in the event of deviations from the assumptions concerning unobserved heterogeneity and the 
relationship with explanatory variables. This last caveat does not apply to the fixed effects truncated Poisson 
model.  
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estimations for the cross-section model were 0.80 (0.79), respectively. Nonetheless, 
individuals receiving a caregiving allowance (home care) record a bigger reduction in the 
number of HAs (LoS). The results for the coordination case and the effect of the 2012/2013 
budgetary cuts using panel data head in the same direction as those of the cross-section 
model, which reinforces our previous conclusions. 
 
6.3 Mechanisms and Falsification Tests 
This section re-examines certain potential channels for addressing the main challenge 
discussed in this paper, involving closer supervision under affordable caregiving, and help to 
explain why access to LTC may lead to fewer HAs, consistent with previous studies (Weaver 
and Weaver, 2014; Sands et al., 2006). We group these mechanisms into four, namely, i) 
greater use of outpatient care, ii) reduced onset of mental conditions, iii) reduced loneliness, 
and iv) housing alterations influencing the opportunity costs of hospitalization.  
6.3.1 Use of Outpatient Care 
We examine the effect of higher affordability and access to LTC on general practitioner (GP) 
visits to test whether there is some degree of substitution of the care that would otherwise be 
provided in hospital. We define a binary variable ‘Has visited GP’ that takes the value 1 if the 
individual has seen or talked to a GP in the last twelve months, and a count variable ‘Number 
of GP visits´ for the number of appointments made in that time (see Table D1 for the 
descriptive statistics). We estimate a logistic model for the probability of having visited a GP, 
and a truncated Poisson
41
 for the number of GP visits, considering the same explanatory 
variables as in the model for HAs, and instrumenting SAAD and SAAD*POST as in the 
previous section. The results shown in Table D2 suggest that the probability of visiting a GP 
in the last twelve months is not significantly affected by the SAAD reform, but we find that 
the number of GP visits in the post-reform is 1.07 times fewer than that of an individual 
receiving an LTC benefit (both caregiving allowance and home care benefit) in the pre-reform 
period. We estimate an increase of 0.3% in primary care costs (see Table 4; the procedure is 
explained in the following section). 
6.3.2 Prevention of Mental Disorders 
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 We have followed the same procedure described in footnote 28 to conclude that the best model is the double-
hurdle Poisson.  
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As an alternative mechanism, we evaluate the reform’s effect on the prevalence of mental 
health conditions, which is found to reduce emergency hospitalizations (Guthrie et al., 2016). 
Specifically, we examine the prevalence of depression and a self-reported preference for 
being dead (see Table D1 for descriptive statistics). We define a binary variable ‘Dead´ and 
another one for being ‘Depressed´ that take the value one if the individual has reported 
preferring to be dead or feeling depressed, respectively. We estimate a probit for both 
variables, using IV for SAAD and SAAD*POST, and observe (see Table D3) that the 
probability of having suicidal thoughts decreases by 7.9 pp. (5.4 pp.) for beneficiaries of 
caregiving allowances (home care beneficiaries) in the post-reform period. A similar effect is 
found for depression (-2.5 pp.), although it is only significant for caregiving allowances).  
6.3.3 Loneliness 
Loneliness can explain a higher prevalence of HAs. Indeed, Molloy et al. (2010) have found 
evidence to suggest that loneliness increases hospitalizations. This effect can be captured in 
our dataset by non-clinical dimensions of being in hospital, such as loneliness, which we 
measure using an IV probit (see Table D1 for descriptive statistics). We find that the 
probability of living alone decreases by 7.4 pp. (2.6 pp.) for beneficiaries of caregiving 
allowances (home care beneficiaries) in the post-reform period (see Table D3). This effect is, 
in turn, consistent with the fact that co-residence with the informal caregiver is a prerequisite 
in Spain for receiving a caregiving allowance.  
6.3.4 Housing Adjustments 
Finally, another mechanism for early hospital discharge refers to the implementation of home 
adjustments or alterations that are a standard requirement for receiving subsidized home care 
or caregiving support. The latter can be captured by examining the effect of a binary variable 
‘Adapted house´ if the household has special features catering for people with physical 
impairments or health problems, and 0 otherwise (see Table D1 for descriptive statistics). We 
estimate a probit model for the probability of living in an adapted house, including the same 
explanatory variables as in the previous regression. The probability of living in an adapted 
house has increased by 0.02 pp for home care beneficiaries after the reform, but it is not 
significant for those receiving caregiving allowances (see Table D3 for estimation results).  
6.3.5 Income Effects 
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A final mechanism involves the impact of SAAD and the probability of individuals making 
ends meet, and hence reducing resource-based reasons for a hospital admission. As expected, 
Table D4 shows a reduction in self-reported household financial difficulties among those 
receiving cash benefits, but the opposite is true among those receiving home care support. It is 
therefore unlikely that the results are driven by income effects.  
6.3.6 Falsification Tests  
As a falsification test, we estimate SAAD’s effect on unrelated types of care, such as the 
probability of a visit to the dentist or cataract surgery. Consistently, Table D5 does not 
provide any evidence of an effect in either type of care.  
6.3. Overall hospitalization costs  
As a way of synthesizing our estimates, we have estimated SAAD’s economic impact 
on hospital costs. Accordingly, we have used official data on the average length and average 
costs of HAs by region and year provided by the Ministry of Health, Social Services and 
Equality. First, we have computed the average cost per day as the ratio between total hospital 
cost and average LoS. Second, we have used the calibrated weights provided by SHARE for 
each wave to obtain the population estimate of the number of beneficiaries of caregiving 
allowances and home care beneficiaries. Third, we have applied the estimated coefficients to 
average length data to obtain the estimated hospital LoS (in days). Finally, we have multiplied 
the estimated hospital LoS by the number of beneficiaries and the average costs per day
42
. 
The results are shown in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
For a better understanding of the magnitude of the results, Table 4 compares the 
estimated increase or decrease in hospital costs with the official data for hospital costs. 
SAAD’s implementation has reduced hospital costs by 11.17%, with 4.95% due to a reduction 
in hospital admissions and 6.22% due to a reduction in LoS. Moreover, in the subset of 
regions with specific coordination programs between healthcare and social services, SAAD 
has led to a reduction in hospital costs of 5.21%: 2.75% from a reduction in the number of 
hospital admissions and 2.46% from a reduction in LoS. Finally, and as expected, the 2012 
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 The procedure used to estimate changes in hospitalisation costs is similar to Holmås et al. (2013). 
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austerity cuts in the LTC subsidy increased costs by 5.67%, which is slightly more than the 
savings from coordination plans. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has drawn on quasi-experimental evidence from the expansion of the 
financial access to affordable long-term care services on HA and utilization. More 
specifically, we examine the effect of SAAD’s introduction in 2007 on the probability of 
hospital admission, number of HAs, and total hospital LoS over the last twelve months. Our 
results provide suggestive evidence of a reduction in HAs and utilization after the reform, 
even after controlling for the endogeneity of the reform’s implementation, carrying out a 
number of robustness checks and falsification tests. Unlike previous evidence, this paper 
draws on a difference-in-differences approach, and hence provides causal estimates to guide 
policy reform.  
 We find that the reduction in HAs is greater among individuals receiving caregiving 
allowances, consistent with the effect of improved supervision and measures for avoiding HA. 
However, the effect on LoS is stronger amongst those receiving home care support, consistent 
with an effect on early discharge. These mechanisms have been further tested. Our results 
show that SAAD has led to an increase in outpatient care and housing adjustments, alongside 
a reduction in the prevalence of mental health symptoms and loneliness after its 
implementation. All of these effects are consistent with the different pathways for reducing 
hospital use reported in the literature, namely, SAAD’s effect on improving the supervision of 
elderly people and reducing preventable hospitalizations.  
Another important finding indicates that the effect of the LTC subsidy (SAAD) was 
stronger among regions with a regional health and social care coordination plan in place, 
insofar as it provides a solution to the chronic underfunding of LTC. However, our results 
suggest that a significant fraction of the savings declines with the reduction of the LTC 
subsidy in 2012. A reduction of the subsidy, by making LTC less affordable, is found to 
increase the length of stay and the number of hospital admissions. Overall, our preferred 
estimates suggest that the implementation of the reform decreased hospital costs by 11%. 
Our results face two limitations. First, our estimates capture ‘hospital admissions’, 
rather than ‘avoidable hospitalizations’, given that we cannot identify the latter in our data. 
Second, our data do not identify subsequent readmissions by patients receiving SAAD. 
Arguably, more patients could be treated if the LoS were shorter, so the estimation of the 
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subsequent costs would be conditioned by waiting lists for certain pathologies and the 
existence of bottlenecks in some internal services at hospitals. 
Notwithstanding these constraints, our results suggest that greater access to affordable 
LTC may reduce both hospital care admissions and utilization. However, the type of LTC 
service has different effects. These results are important for policy insofar as they suggest that 
expanding LTC services and support can provide additional savings in the provision of 
hospital care. Furthermore, access to affordable care can improve care coordination and help 
to further reduce hospital utilization
43
. Finally, given that our results refer to both those 
receiving cash and in-kind benefits, they have important policy implications for systems that 
rely on one or other of them for LTC services and support.  
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 Holmås et al. (2013) investigate the effect of fining owners of long-term care institutions that prolong LoS at 
hospitals in Norway. Surprisingly, the study found that the stay is longer when fines are used, which is 
interpreted as an example of monetary incentives crowding-out intrinsic motivation. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Implementation of the SAAD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For a better understanding of the amounts of caregiver allowance and disability allowance, they can be compared with Spain’s 
minimum wage of €460.50 per month (2004), €540.90 per month (2006), €570.60 per month (2007), €641.40 per month (2011) and €645.30 
per month (2013). 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of hospital admissions (extensive margin) by type of subsidy 2004-
2013. 
 
Note: This figure plots the percentage of hospitalized population by three types of individuals, namely, those who do not benefit from the 
reform, those who receive economic benefits (caregiving allowance), and those who receive a subsidized home care service.  
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Economic benefit for caregivers Home care
Do not receive any LTC benefit
Disability allowance (degree of 
disability higher than 65%) 
• €322 (including caregiving and 
transport allowance) 
• Means-tested (very strict income 
threshold)  
• Age: 18–65  
• Additional €161 for caregiver 
allowance in the case of severe 
disability 
2004 & 2006 
Waves 1 & 2 
Caregiving allowance  
(article 18, SAAD) 
• Major dependency level 2: 
€487 
• Major dependency level 1: 
€390  
Home Care 
• Major dependency level 2: 
Between 70-90 hours/month 
• Major dependency level 1: 
Between 55-70 hours/month 
 
• Both of them: Not means-
tested, but with co-payments 
(computed according to 
awardee’s income and assets) 
 
Spain’s Law 39/2006, of December 14, on the Promotion of 
Personal Autonomy and Care for Dependent Persons 
(SAAD) 
Caregiving allowance  
Coverage extended to severe 
dependency and moderate 
dependency level 2 
• Major dependency level 2: €530 
• Major dependency level 1: €417 
• Severe dependency level 2: €337 
• Severe dependency level 1: €300 
• Moderate dependency level 2: €180 
Home Care 
• Major dependency level 2: same as 
before 
• Major dependency level 1: same as 
before 
• Severe dependency level 2: 
Between 40-55 hours/month 
• Severe dependency level 1: 
Between 30-40 hours/month 
Moderate dependency level 2: 
• Co-payment was suspended in 
2011 by a High Court ruling 
2011 
Wave 4  
2007 
Wave 2 
2013 
Wave 5 
Budgetary cuts introduced 
(Royal Decree 20/2012, July 13) 
Caregiving allowance  
 
• Previous beneficiaries 
• Major dependency level 2: €442 
• Major dependency level 1: €354 
• Severe dependency level 2: €286 
• Severe dependency level 1: €255 
• Moderate dependency level 2: €153 
• New beneficiaries 
• Major dependency: €387 
• Severe dependency: €268 
• Moderate dependency: €153 
• (No distinction between levels) 
Home Care 
• Major dependency: 46-70 
hours/month 
• Severe dependency: 21-45 
hours/month 
• Moderate dependency (previous 
beneficiaries): Maximum 20 
hours/month 
New beneficiaries qualified as 
moderately dependent will have to wait 
until July 2015. 
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Figure 3. Density function of hospital Length of Stay  by exposure to the 2007 reform 
and 2012 austerity cuts 
 
Benef: Beneficiaries. No benef: no beneficiaries 
Note: Density function for the number of days hospitalized over last 12 months, distinguishing between beneficiaries of LTC benefits and 
non-beneficiaries (not receiving either home care benefits or caregiving allowances). Straight lines refer to pre-reform hospitalization for 
both those affected (red) and those not affected (black) by the reform. Bold dotted lines refer to the post-2007 reform, and light dotted lines 
refer to those affected by the 2012 reform. 
 
Figure 4. Density function of number of hospital admissions (intensive margin) by 
exposure to the 2007 reform and 2012 austerity cuts 
 
Benef: Beneficiaries. No benef: no beneficiaries 
Note: Density function for the number of hospital stays distinguishing between beneficiaries of LTC benefits and non-beneficiaries (not 
receiving either home care benefits or caregiving allowances). Straight lines refer to pre-reform hospitalization for both those affected (red) 
and those not affected (black) by the reform. Bold dotted lines refer to the post-2007 reform, and light dotted lines refer to those affected by 
the 2012 reform. 
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Table 1. Coordination between healthcare and LTC services 
Region of Spain Name of the Program or Agency Period 
Community of León 
Plan de Atención Sociosanitario  
 Decree 59/2003, of January 23 
Coord = 1 for all waves 
Community of La Mancha 
Consejería de Salud y Bienestar Social  
 Decree 139/2008, of September 9 
Coord = 1 for Waves 4 and 5 
Catalonia Plan Director Sociosanitario. Programa Vida 
als Anys. 
Plan de Atención Sociosanitario 2000 
Plan Director Sociosanitario 2006 
 Decree 242/1999, of August 31 
Coord = 1 for all waves 
Community of Valencia Programa Especial de la Atención Sanitaria a 
pacientes ancianos, a pacientes con 
enfermedades de larga evolución y a pacientes 
en situación terminal (PALET), 1995.  
Coord = 1 for all waves 
Extremadura Consejería de Sanidad y Dependencia 
Law 1/2008, of May 22 
Coord = 1 for Waves 4 and 5 
Navarre Plan Foral de Atención Sociosanitaria.  
Agreement of the Government of 
Navarre of June 27, 2000 
Coord = 1 for all waves 
Basque Country Consejo Vasco de Atención Sociosanitaria  
Coord = 1 for Wave 5 
Coord is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if there is a coordination program between healthcare and LTC services in the region, and 0 
otherwise. Source: Jiménez-Martín et al. (2011).  
 
Table 2. First-stage regressions 
 
 𝐶𝐴 𝐶𝐴*POST 𝐻𝐵 𝐻𝐵*POST 
Socialist support (%) -0.045*** -0.057*** 0.088** 0.097*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Socialist support (%)*POST -0.028* -0.047*** 0.128** 0.084** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
Home Care (2000) -0.016** -0.006* 0.025* 0.031** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Home Care (2002) -0.035** -0.044** 0.051* 0.072*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Fraction of women at home 0.044** 0.046*** -0.023* -0.018* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural area 0.022** 0.021** -0.016* -0.014* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
F-test instrumental variables 234.56 154.07 160.41 150.46 
F(6,14722) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 
14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 
CA: caregiving allowance. HB: home care benefits. POST: binary variable that takes the value 1 after the implementation of SAAD (i.e., 
since 2007, and 0 otherwise. Home Care (2000) and Home Care (2002) denote the coverage index of home care benefits at regional level. 
The coverage index is defined as the ratio between the number of beneficiaries aged 65 and over divided by the total population aged 65 and 
over. Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, level of education, self-reported health status, Katz Index, real income, real 
wealth, year and regional dummies are not shown. Standard deviations between parentheses *** means significance at 1% level, ** at 5% 
level, * at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Hurdle Poisson for number (𝑯𝑵𝒊) and LoS of hospital admissions (𝑯𝑳𝑺𝒊).  
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 𝐻𝐵𝑖 
 𝐻𝑖 
 
Logit 
𝐻𝑁𝑖  
 
Trunc Poisson 
𝐻𝐿𝑆𝑖 
 
Trunc Poisson 
𝐻𝑖 
 
Logit 
𝐻𝑁𝑖  
 
Trunc Poisson 
𝐻𝐿𝑆𝑖 
 
Trunc Poisson 
A. Baseline       
SAAD 0.078*** 1.134** 0.862*** 0.052*** 1.019 1.267*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) 
SAAD*POST -0.095*** 0.801** 0.791*** 0.014 0.895** 0.696*** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
       
Resid. (SAAD) -1.009 24.160*** -17.517*** 0.712 -27.375*** -6.014*** 
 (1.93) (4.34) (5.53) (0.71) (7.64) (2.03) 
Resid. (SAAD* POST) -0.045 14.005*** 14.251*** 1.180 22.485*** 4.988 
 (0.79) (3.61) (2.26) (1.50) (5.77) (4.28) 
F-test residuals 
(p-value) 
0.41 
(0.524) 
 63.20 
(0.000) 
56.18 
(0.000) 
0.02 
(0.890) 
 61.28 
(0.000) 
48.23 
(0.000) 
Hausman test 19.374 295.630 217.196 2.791 278.968 591.267 
 (𝜒45
2 ; p-value) (0.999) (0.000) (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) (0.000) 
B. Coordination Plans 
      
SAAD 0.084*** 1.779** 0.834*** 0.053*** 1.032 1.236*** 
 (0.02) (0.25) (0.06) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02) 
SAAD*POST -0.077*** 0.862*** 0.818*** 0.016 0.892** 0.729*** 
 (0.02) (0.27) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) 
Coordination 0.038 0.958 1.027 0.038 1.021 0.924 
 (0.03) (0.36) (0.08) (0.03) (0.35) (0.08) 
Coordination* POST -0.095*** 1.154 1.102 -0.089*** 1.009 0.129 
 (0.03) (0.33) (0.08) (0.03) (0.32) (0.08) 
SAAD *Coord -0.031 1.333*** 1.030 -0.019 1.484 1.426*** 
 (0.04) (0.36) (0.12) (0.03) (0.26) (0.07) 
SAAD* Coord *POST -0.116* 0.862*** 1.120 -0.185*** 0.793*** 0.667*** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.18) (0.02) (0.05) (0.17) 
F-test for residuals 0.25 
(0.615) 
77.33 
(0.000) 
78.96 
(0.000) 
0.40 
(0.526) 
75.46 
(0.000) 
80.23 
(0.000) 
C. Effect of budgetary cuts 
      
SAAD 0.078*** 0.836 0.862*** 0.052*** 1.014 1.269*** 
 (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) 
SAAD*POST (2011&2013) -0.104* 0.887 0.864*** -0.028 0.517 0.871*** 
 (0.06) (0.70) (0.05) (0.07) (0.97) (0.21) 
SAAD*POST (2013) -0.288 1.161** 1.287** 0.656 1.399*** 1.484** 
 (2.61) (0.05) (0.60) (1.37) (0.07) (0.29) 
F-test for residuals 0.59 
(0.443) 
87.15 
(0.000) 
80.91 
(0.000) 
0.06 
(0.802) 
84.87 
(0.000) 
87.23 
(0.000) 
N 14,766 1,705 1,705 14,766 1,705 1,705 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖 : binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for individuals receiving LTC benefits (either caregiving 
allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). H: having been hospitalized in the last 12 months. HN: number of hospitalizations in the last 
12 months. HLS: length of stay at hospital during all hospitalizations in the last 12 months. POST: binary variable that takes the value 1 after 
the reform in the Spanish LTC system.  
Notes: Logit for the first hurdle; zero truncated Poisson for the second hurdle (two alternative dependent variables). Marginal effects are 
shown for the first hurdle; incidence rate ratios are shown for the second hurdle. For residuals, we report the estimated coefficients. Bootstrap 
with 100 repetitions. The first hurdle (𝐻𝑖) coincides for both hurdle Poisson models.  
Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, level of education, self-reported health status, Katz Index, real income, real wealth, per 
capita public healthcare expenditure, number of public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, satisfaction with public healthcare system, 
infection rate at hospital, year and regional dummies are not shown. Standard deviations between parentheses. *** means significance at 1% 
level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. 
Baseline: F-test of residuals is distributed according to F(2,14726) for the logit model, and F(2,1665) for the truncated Poisson. 
Coordination case: F-test of residuals is distributed according to F(4,14724) for the logit model, and F(4,1663) for the truncated Poisson. 
Effect of budgetary cuts: F-test of residuals is distributed according to F(3,14725) for the logit model, and F(3,1664) for the truncated 
Poisson. 
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Table 4. Estimation of  SAAD’s impact on hospital costs (Figures in euros) 
 
 Reduction/increase in hospital costs due to Hospital costs* 
2007 
 
(1)+(2) w/r to 
hospital costs 
% 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 
(1) 
𝐻𝐵𝑖  
(2) 
Total 
(1)+(2) 
Number of hospital 
admissions    
  
Base Case 
-609,147,824 -120,235,688 -729,383,512 
 
14,727,559,994 -4.95 
 (-583,563,615, -639,605,215) (-114,464,375, -126,007,001) (-698,027,990, -765,612,216)   
Coordination  
-160,527,318 -34,122,441 -194,649,758 
 
7,063,627,888 -2.75 
 (-152,822,007, -167,269,465) (-32,894,033, -35,350,849) (-185,716,040, -202,620,314)   
SAAD’s impact 
2013 239,468,171 290,442,486 529,910,657 
 
14,727,559,994 3.60 
 (239,468,171, 250,962,643) (278,824,787, 302,060,185) (518,292,958, 553,022,829)   
Hospital length of 
stay 
     
Base Case 
-600,824,472 -314,387,318 -915,211,790 
 
14,727,559,994 -6.22 
 (-553,960,163, -638,075,589) (-296,152,854, -33,2621,782) (-850,113,017, -970,697,372)   
Coordination  No signif, -112,975,580 -173,439,479 7,063,627,888 -2.46 
 - (-106,761,923, -119,189,237) (-106,761,923, -119,189,237)   
SAAD’s impact 
2013 233,564,656 71,077,192 304,641,847 
 
14,727,559,994 2.07 
 (233,564,656, 248,746,359) (67,239,024, 74,915,360) (300,803,680, 323,661,719)   
Total effect      
Base Case 
-1,209,972,296 -434,623,006 -1,644,595,302 
 
14,727,559,994 -11.17 
 (-1,141,003,875, -1,264,421,049) (-408,980,249, -460,265,763) (-1549,984,124, -172,4686,813)   
Coordination  
-160,527,318 -147,098,021 -368,089,237 
 
7,063,627,888 -5.21 
 (-150,414,097, -169,677,375) (-138,272,140, -155,923,902) (-288,686,237, -325,601,277)   
SAAD’s impact 
2013 473,032,827 361,519,678 834,552,504 
 
14,727,559,994 5.67 
 (443231759, 502833895) (344,166,733, 378,872,623) (817,199,560, 881,706,518)   
Consultations with 
General 
Practitioner 24,114,377 8,094,675 32,209,052 10,509,486,000 0.31 
 (22691629,25537125) (7687440,8458935) (30598559,33819505)   
CA: caregiving allowance. HB: home care benefits. Confidence intervals between parentheses 
Cost data refer to Spain for the base case. For the other cases, hospital costs are computed as the sum of hospital costs in the affected regions.  
Data on hospital costs from the Ministry of Health, Social Affairs and Immigration: 
http://pestadistico.inteligenciadegestion.msssi.es/publicoSNS/comun/DefaultPublico.aspx 
Data on total costs linked to consultations with GP: 
https://www.msssi.gob.es/estadEstudios/estadisticas/sisInfSanSNS/pdf/egspGastoReal.pdf 
Cost per consultation with GP from Resolution of June 30, 2006: 74 €/visit 
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Appendix to the paper ‘Does Long-Term Care 
Subsidization Reduce Hospital Admissions and Utilization?’ 
by Joan Costa-Font, Sergi Jimenez-Martin and Cristina 
Vilaplana. 
 
Appendix A. Descriptive and imputation statistics  
Table. A1 Percentage of population aged 65 and over 
 2004 2007 2011 2013 
Andalusia 14.76 14.63 15.21 15.65 
Aragón 20.97 20.16 19.97 20.22 
Asturias 22.13 21.91 22.36 23.06 
Balearic Isles 13.87 13.69 14.25 14.67 
Canary Islands 12.06 12.44 13.80 14.45 
Cantabria 18.99 18.57 18.74 19.32 
Community of León 22.80 22.52 22.82 23.29 
Community of La Mancha 19.43 18.28 17.61 17.71 
Catalonia 16.92 16.42 16.78 17.33 
Community of Valencia 16.30 16.25 17.14 17.90 
Extremadura 19.26 18.99 19.18 19.37 
Galicia 21.32 21.58 22.52 23.15 
Madrid 14.48 14.40 15.01 15.75 
Murcia 14.09 13.75 14.05 14.53 
Navarre 17.68 17.45 17.62 18.14 
Basque Country 18.24 18.54 19.54 20.22 
La Rioja 18.96 18.36 18.46 18.94 
Ceuta  10.93 10.93 10.57 10.32 
Spain 16.90 16.66 17.15 17.69 
Source: Municipal Register of Inhabitants. National Institute of Statistics 
Table A2. Ratios of dependency assessment and award of benefits by year and region 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
∗ 100 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
∗ 100 
 2008 2011 2013 2008 2011 2013 
Andalusia 70.04 66.36 88.18 77.14 89.86 65.80 
Aragón 89.09 70.13 97.13 80.38 76.62 62.10 
Asturias 62.40 61.28 94.44 85.31 73.00 55.89 
Balearic Isles 32.01 70.83 97.85 81.74 61.08 64.61 
Canary Islands 36.92 69.40 75.53 78.41 38.49 81.75 
Cantabria 67.74 79.78 99.90 68.62 81.75 68.94 
Community of León 96.82 74.19 95.69 80.14 98.42 63.49 
Community of La Mancha 67.12 63.04 95.11 77.20 88.95 57.38 
Catalonia 95.56 71.84 96.98 85.54 74.18 59.91 
Community of Valencia 92.67 67.84 98.05 87.61 62.74 61.47 
Extremadura 71.12 64.52 95.63 70.47 65.94 56.81 
Galicia 64.95 70.01 97.74 82.45 55.13 71.69 
Madrid 96.21 69.34 98.05 92.25 95.26 58.47 
Murcia 100.00 76.89 81.03 100.00 81.11 76.20 
Navarre 63.66 65.92 97.09 56.53 86.09 54.84 
Basque Country 99.99 65.75 97.25 100.00 88.37 56.79 
La Rioja 66.95 68.11 99.99 82.85 100.00 52.72 
Ceuta  91.92 60.02 96.56 71.51 93.36 53.86 
Spain 75.43 68.69 93.82 81.46 80.53 62.61 
Source: Own work using data from the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality. First available data correspond to May 
2008. Data for 2011 and 2013 correspond to the month of July. 
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Table A3. Description of the initial sample and the missing values by region 
 Initial sample Missing values for 
hospitalization variables 
Final sample 
 N % N % N % 
Andalusia 3,329 22,41 12 13,33 3,238 21,93 
Aragón 471 3,17 0 0,00 483 3,27 
Asturias 344 2,32 2 2,22 294 1,99 
Balearic Isles 158 1,07 2 2,22 142 0,96 
Canary Islands 649 4,37 0 0,00 597 4,04 
Cantabria 156 1,05 2 2,22 162 1,10 
Community of León 1,054 7,10 0 0,00 1,034 7,00 
Community of La Mancha 1,003 6,75 0 0,00 1,035 7,01 
Catalonia 2,059 13,86 14 15,56 2,199 14,90 
Community of Valencia 1,632 10,99 10 11,11 1,561 10,57 
Extremadura 272 1,83 0 0,00 342 2,31 
Galicia 626 4,21 16 17,78 534 3,61 
Madrid 1,670 11,24 20 22,22 1,703 11,53 
Murcia 578 3,89 6 6,67 612 4,15 
Navarre 272 1,83 0 0,00 267 1,81 
Basque Country 401 2,70 2 2,22 376 2,55 
Rioja 159 1,07 4 4,44 174 1,18 
Ceuta 21 0,14 0 0,00 13 0,09 
Total 14,854 100 88 100,00 14,766 100 
Note: We have obtained the final sample by discarding observations for which the codes “refusal” or “don’t know” had been registered for 
the following variables: “having been hospitalized over the last 12 months”, “number of hospitalizations over the last 12 months” and “total 
number of nights in hospital over the last 12 months”. 
 
Table A4. Description of final samples by wave and region 
 Final sample 
Wave 1 
Final sample 
Wave 2 
Final sample 
Wave 4 
Final sample 
Wave 5 
 N % N % N % N % 
Andalusia 556 24.57 566 24.49 760 20.72 1,355 20.76 
Aragón 70 3.11 68 2.96 124 3.37 221 3.38 
Asturias 65 2.89 67 2.91 58 1.57 103 1.58 
Balearic Isles 36 1.6 24 1.04 35 0.95 47 0.72 
Canary Islands 122 5.4 103 4.47 142 3.87 230 3.52 
Cantabria 24 1.08 19 0.83 43 1.18 75 1.15 
Community of León 138 6.09 184 7.96 243 6.63 468 7.18 
Community of La Mancha 135 5.96 171 7.38 232 6.34 497 7.61 
Catalonia 255 11.27 250 10.82 628 17.13 1,069 16.38 
Community of Valencia 255 11.27 283 12.22 371 10.11 652 9.99 
Extremadura 15 0.65 10 0.42 121 3.31 197 3.02 
Galicia 124 5.48 137 5.93 121 3.31 150 2.3 
Madrid 232 10.28 245 10.61 414 11.29 811 12.43 
Murcia 83 3.67 70 3.02 165 4.49 296 4.53 
Navarre 43 1.9 46 1.98 66 1.8 112 1.72 
Basque Country 79 3.5 46 1.98 97 2.64 155 2.37 
Rioja 21 0.95 17 0.73 47 1.29 89 1.36 
Ceuta 7 0.33 6 0.25 0 0 0 0 
Total 2,253 100.00 2,361 100.00 3,627 100.00 6,525 100.00 
Note: Final sample corresponding to each wave of SHARE after discarding 88 observations with missing values for hospitalization variables. 
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Table A5. Comparison between imputed data for public home care benefit and official data 
 Comparison between imputations for public 
home care benefit and official data 
Home Care beneficiaries in Wave 2 that 
continue in Wave 4 
 Official data 
Home Care 
June 2011 
Imputations  
Home Care 
Distribution of Wave 
2 beneficiaries that 
continue in Wave 4 
Number identified 
with the imputation 
process 
 N % N % N % N % 
Andalusia 47,941 43.35 41,514 40.02 11,995 54.04 11,395 54.60 
Aragón 0 0.00 2,292 2.21 376 1.69 341 1.63 
Asturias 1,822 1.65 1,504 1.45 247 1.11 220 1.05 
Balearic Isles 0 0.00 695 0.67 114 0.51 101 0.48 
Canary Islands 0 0.00 1,504 1.45 247 1.11 213 1.02 
Cantabria 763 0.69 571 0.55 94 0.42 70 0.34 
Community of León 6,955 6.29 6,203 5.98 1,017 4.58 957 4.59 
Community of La Mancha 6,228 5.63 5197 5.01 852 3.84 803 3.85 
Catalonia 13,428 12.14 10,508 10.13 1,723 7.76 1,658 7.94 
Community of Valencia 0 0.00 1,390 1.34 228 1.03 199 0.95 
Extremadura 689 0.62 446 0.43 73 0.33 55 0.26 
Galicia 5,841 5.28 5612 5.41 920 4.15 845 4.05 
Madrid 19,510 17.64 17,334 16.71 2,842 12.80 2,712 13.00 
Murcia 0 0.00 1,162 1.12 190 0.86 165 0.79 
Navarre 409 0.37 633 0.61 104 0.47 75 0.36 
Basque Country 4,589 4.15 5238 5.05 859 3.87 799 3.83 
Rioja 2,072 1.87 1,712 1.65 281 1.26 240 1.15 
Ceuta 339 0.31 218 0.21 36 0.16 21 0.10 
Total 110,586 100 103,732 100 22,195 100 20,869 100 
Number of observations (SHARE)   180  100  102  
Note: Official data on home care benefits from the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality corresponding to June 2011 and own 
imputations of public home care benefits for Wave 4. 
 
Table A6. Comparison between National Health Survey and SHARE 
 National Health Survey SHARE 
 2003 2006 2011 Wave 1 
2004 
Wave 2 
2006/07 
Wave 4 
2011 
Percentage of hospitalizations       
Andalusia 14.43 10.64 9.70 12.85 10.43 12.37 
Aragón 17.18 11.53 11.65 14.72 11.88 14.78 
Asturias 17.77 11.79 11.55 15.16 11.97 15.04 
Balearic Isles 16.61 14.78 16.92 16.10 16.26 17.20 
Canary Islands 11.91 10.00 11.24 11.23 10.89 11.87 
Cantabria 12.66 14.44 10.99 13.90 13.04 12.13 
Community of León 11.17 12.10 10.81 11.93 11.75 11.27 
Community of La Mancha 13.52 15.33 11.68 14.80 13.85 12.92 
Catalonia 16.31 14.97 13.79 16.04 14.75 15.44 
Community of Valencia 15.39 12.81 11.52 14.46 12.48 13.80 
Extremadura 13.00 13.58 15.97 13.63 15.15 14.85 
Galicia 12.20 12.29 9.62 12.56 11.24 11.19 
Madrid 17.40 12.91 10.90 15.54 12.21 14.51 
Murcia 12.15 15.86 13.86 14.36 15.24 13.34 
Navarre 12.90 11.01 7.89 12.26 9.69 10.66 
Basque Country 14.30 14.32 11.37 14.68 13.17 13.16 
Rioja 8.89 11.97 12.05 10.70 12.32 10.74 
Ceuta 10.72 19.66 11.07 15.58 15.76 11.17 
Number of hospitalizations       
Andalusia 1.49 1.33 1.47 1.44 1.44 1.52 
Aragón 1.31 1.40 1.39 1.39 1.43 1.39 
Asturias 1.91 1.22 1.15 1.60 1.22 1.57 
Balearic Isles 1.26 1.33 1.69 1.33 1.55 1.51 
Canary Islands 1.24 1.45 1.33 1.38 1.43 1.32 
Cantabria 1.24 1.35 1.14 1.33 1.27 1.22 
Community of León 1.27 1.28 1.51 1.31 1.43 1.43 
Community of La Mancha 1.36 1.29 1.34 1.36 1.35 1.38 
Catalonia 1.55 1.40 1.36 1.52 1.42 1.49 
Community of Valencia 1.16 1.37 1.62 1.29 1.53 1.42 
Extremadura 1.30 1.42 1.19 1.39 1.34 1.27 
Galicia 1.45 1.36 1.49 1.44 1.46 1.51 
Madrid 1.28 1.48 1.70 1.42 1.63 1.53 
Murcia 1.23 1.44 1.54 1.37 1.53 1.42 
Navarre 1.47 1.52 1.42 1.54 1.51 1.49 
Basque Country 1.47 1.21 1.43 1.38 1.35 1.49 
Rioja 1.15 1.73 1.33 1.48 1.57 1.27 
Ceuta 1.66 1.37 1.64 1.55 1.54 1.69 
Note: Data from National Health Survey from the National Institute of Statistics. Sample has been restricted to respondents aged 50 and over.  
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Table A7. Descriptive statistics for total number of hospital admissions and length of stay over the last year (mean; median between 
parentheses; standard deviation between parentheses) 
 Wave 1 & 2 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Hospital length of stay    
Non-beneficiaries 10.23 [5] 12.38 [7] 10.33 [5] 
 (16.80) (14.52) (18.37) 
Beneficiaries SAAD benefit    
Caregiving allowance (𝐶𝐴𝑖) 11.35 [4.5] 8.75 [6.5] 12.09 [10.5] 
 (19.98) (7.07) (13.03) 
Home care (𝐻𝐵𝑖) 15.36 [9.5] 11.54 [10] 11.78 [8] 
 (24.75) (13.19) (14.81) 
Total 15.33 [7] 10.75 [8] 11.82 [9] 
 (24.62) (11.81) (14.49) 
Number of hospital admissions    
Non-beneficiaries 1.70 [1] 1.80 [1] 1.60 [1] 
    
Beneficiaries SAAD benefit    
Caregiving allowance (𝐶𝐴𝑖) 2.04 [1] 1.62 [1] 2.13 [1] 
 (1.88) (1.56) (1.72) 
Home care (𝐻𝐵𝑖) 1.86 [1] 1.75 [1] 1.92 [1] 
 (1.67) (1.45) (1.12) 
Total 2.01 [1] 1.71 [1] 2.01 [1] 
 (1.49) (1.53) (1.82) 
Source: SHARE, several years. 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖 : binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for individuals receiving LTC 
benefits (either caregiving allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). Total number of individuals hospitalized: 1,389 for non-
beneficiaries (Waves 1&2: 418; Wave 4: 344; Wave 5: 627), 185 for 𝐶𝐵𝑖 (Waves 1&2: 65; Wave 4: 41; Wave 5; 79), 170 for 𝐻𝐵𝑖 (Waves 
1&2: 85; Wave 4: 45; Wave 5: 40); 355 for total beneficiaries (Waves1&2: 150; Wave 2: 86; Wave 5: 119). Total number of observations: 
13,512 for non-beneficiaries, 751 for 𝐶𝐵𝑖, 503 for 𝐻𝐵𝑖, 1,254 for total beneficiaries. 
 
Table A8. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 𝐻𝐵𝑖 Any SAAD benefit No SAAD benefit 
Male 51.93 33.28 44.02 44.88 
Age 65.13 77.05 70.30 67.09 
 (10.03) (10.83) (12.01) (11.05) 
Marital status     
Married/cohabiting 72.97 58.54 66.51 77.72 
Separated/divorced 4.39 2.09 3.35 2.86 
Single 13.58 7.49 10.77 5.37 
Widowed 7.59 31.01 18.10 12.95 
Missing marital status 1.47 0.87 1.27 1.10 
Education     
No schooling  25.97 31.71 28.31 18.62 
Elementary 52.46 42.16 48.72 53.97 
High School 6.79 5.75 6.22 9.31 
College 14.78 20.38 16.75 18.10 
Self-reported health     
Excellent 0.80 0.35 0.64 3.36 
Good 3.33 2.26 2.87 13.89 
Fair 17.44 13.59 16.03 35.82 
Poor 78.43 83.80 80.46 46.93 
Dependency degree     
Katz0 69.77 49.83 62.04 89.25 
Katz1 13.32 21.60 16.91 6.26 
Katz2 7.46 11.15 9.09 2.05 
Katz3 9.45 17.42 11.96 2.44 
Real wealth (€2011) 219,620 267,752 243,281 299,106 
 (592,726) (979,304) (799,507) (740,467) 
Real income (€2011) 19,549 16,519 18,399.2 21,792 
 (19,325) (18,262) (19,221) (26,805) 
N 751 503 1,254 13,512 
CA: caregiving allowance. HB: home care benefits. Standard deviation between parentheses. The dependency degree is approximated using 
the Katz Index (Katz, 1983). The Katz Index determines functional status as a measurement of the ability to perform six daily living 
activities independently. We have computed this index using the information on daily living activities provided by SHARE. Respondents 
have been classified into four categories: Katz0 indicates that the individual performs all activities independently; Katz1 indicates that the 
individual performs four or five activities independently (which could be identified as a moderate degree of dependency); Katz2 indicates 
that the individual only performs two or three activities independently (severe dependency); Katz3 indicates that the individual needs help for 
all activities (or all but one), and should therefore be considered a major dependent.. 
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Table A9. Hospital-related variables 
 2004 2006 2007 2011 2013 
Infection rate at hospital a 1.16 1.19 1.18 1.26 1.32 
Number of public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants a 2.22 2.15 2.30 2.42 2.53 
Degree of satisfaction with public healthcare a 
 (1: minimum satisfaction; 10: maximum satisfaction) 
6.25 5.62 6.36 6.57 6.31 
Public health expenditure per capita (€2011) a 1,152 1,333 1,390 1,392 1,248 
Rate of medical hospital complications b 3.37 3.60 3.60 4.31 4.38 
a Indicators of the National Health System (Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality) 
b Number of discharges with at least one complication during hospital stay, divided by total number of discharges. Advanced Indicators i-
CMBD. http://icmbd.es/login-success.do 
 
 
Appendix B. Instrumental Variables Support Information 
 
 
Table B1. Percentage of votes for the socialist party in regional elections 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 4 Wave 5 
 2004 2006 2007 2011 2013 
Andalusia 51.07 51.07 51.07 48.41 39.52 
Aragón 37.91 37.91 41.03 41.03 21.41 
Asturias 40.30 40.30 42.04 42.04 26.45 
Balearic Isles 24.60 24.60 31.75 31.75 18.94 
Canary Islands  25.50 25.50 34.72 34.72 19.96 
Cantabria 29.91 29.91 24.33 24.33 14.01 
Community of León 36.74 36.74 37.49 37.49 37.77 
Community of La 
Mancha 57.81 57.81 51.92 51.92 36.11 
Catalonia 31.16 31.16 27.38 18.32 14.43 
Community of 
Valencia 46.92 46.92 34.49 34.49 20.30 
Extremadura 51.62 51.62 52.90 52.90 41.50 
Galicia 22.20 33.64 33.64 31.02 20.61 
Madrid 33.46 33.46 33.47 33.47 25.44 
Murcia 34.03 34.03 31.81 31.81 23.96 
Navarre 21.14 21.14 22.40 22.40 13.43 
Basque Country 17.90 22.68 22.68 30.70 19.14 
La Rioja 38.29 38.29 40.47 40.47 26.70 
Ceuta 8.76 8.76 8.71 8.71 11.70 
Source: author’s own work using http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/autonomicas/ 
Aragón, Asturias, Balearic Isles, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Community of León, Community of La Mancha, Community of Valencia, 
Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, La Rioja, and Ceuta: 
 Results from regional elections May 25, 2003 have been applied to  Waves 1 and  Wave 2 (2006). 
 Results from regional elections May 27, 2007 have been applied to  Wave 2 (2007) and  Wave 4. 
 Results from regional elections May 22, 2011 have been applied to  Wave 5. 
Andalusia: 
 Results from regional elections March 14, 2004 have been applied to Waves 1 and 2. 
 Results from regional elections March 9, 2008 have been applied to Wave 4. 
 Results from regional election March 25t, 2012 have been applied to Wave 5.  
Catalonia 
 Results from regional elections November 16, 2003 have been applied to Wave 1 and Wave 2 (only 2006). 
 Results from regional elections November 1, 2006 have been applied to Wave 2 (only 2007). 
 Results from regional elections November 28, 2010 have been applied to Wave 1 
 Results from regional elections November 25, 2012 have been applied to Wave 5. 
Basque Country 
 Results from regional elections May 13, 2001 have been applied to Wave 1.  
 Results from regional elections April 17, 2005 have been applied to Wave 2. 
 Results from regional elections March 1, 2009 have been applied to Wave 4. 
 Results from regional elections October 21, 2012 have been applied to Wave 5. 
Galicia 
 Results from regional elections October 21, 2001 have been applied to Wave 1.  
 Results from regional elections June 19, 2005 have been applied to Wave 2. 
 Results from regional elections March 1, 2009 have been applied to Wave 4. 
 Results from regional elections October 21, 2012 have been applied to Wave 5 
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Table B2. Coverage index of public home care 
 2000 2002 
Andalusia 1.79 2.04 
Aragón 2.52 2.44 
Asturias 1.51 1.79 
Balearic Isles 2.28 2.78 
Canary Islands 1.9 1.88 
Cantabria 1.51 1.55 
Community of León 2.54 2.48 
Community of La 
Mancha 2.13 2.55 
Catalonia 1.23 1.3 
Community of 
Valencia 0.78 2.16 
Extremadura 4.69 4.86 
Galicia 1.16 1.35 
Madrid 1.98 1.89 
Murcia 1.44 1.60 
Navarre 3.33 3.02 
Basque Country 2.3 2.85 
Rioja 2.76 2.84 
Ceuta 2.79 1.76 
Coverage index: ratio of number of home care beneficiaries divided by 
population aged 65 and over and multiplied by 100. Source: ‘Las personas 
mayores en España´ (IMSERSO, 2000, 2002) 
 
 
Appendix C. Panel and Additional Estimates  
 
Table C1. Hurdle Poisson for number (𝑯𝑵𝒊) and length of stay of hospital admissions (𝑯𝑳𝑺𝒊) without control function. Logit for the 
first hurdle; zero truncated Poisson for the second hurdle. Marginal effects are shown for the first hurdle; incidence rate ratio are 
shown for the second hurdle. Bootstrap with 100 repetitions. The first hurdle (𝑯𝒊) coincides for both hurdle Poisson models.  
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 
Without control function 
𝐻𝐵𝑖 
Without control function 
 𝐻𝑖 𝐻𝑁𝑖  𝐻𝐿𝑆𝑖 𝐻𝑖 𝐻𝑁𝑖  𝐻𝐿𝑆𝑖 
A. Baseline       
SAAD 0.079*** 1.109** 0.912*** 0.052*** 1.087 1.312*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) 
SAAD*POST -0.096*** 0.778*** 0.776*** 0.015 0.874*** 0.695*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
B. Coordination Plans       
SAAD 0.085*** 1.815*** 0.847*** 0.054*** 1.058 1.239*** 
 (0.01) (0.18) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) 
SAAD*POST -0.077*** 0.903*** 0.878*** 0.016 0.948** 0.801*** 
 (0.01) (0.20) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Coordination 0.038 0.958 1.027 0.038 1.021 0.924 
 (0.01) (0.29) (0.05) (0.01) (0.25) (0.08) 
Coordination* POST -0.095*** 1.154 1.102 -0.090*** 1.009 0.129 
 (0.02) (0.33) (0.05) (0.01) (0.25) (0.05) 
SAAD *Coord -0.031 1.396*** 1.091 -0.019 1.556 1.4296*** 
 (0.02) (0.30) (0.10) (0.01) (0.26) (0.04) 
SAAD* Coord *POST -0.117* 0.914*** 1.187 -0.18*** 0.843*** 0.724*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) 
C. Effect of budgetary cuts       
SAAD 0.078*** 0.878 0.915*** 0.052*** 1.078 1.333*** 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 
SAAD*POST (2011&2013) -0.105* 0.906 0.924*** -0.029 0.598 0.847*** 
 (0.02) (0.65) (0.03) (0.05) (0.90) (0.22) 
SAAD*POST (2013) -0.289 1.203** 1.347** 0.657 1.459*** 1.556** 
 (1.51) (0.02) (0.50) (1.12) (0.05) (0.22) 
N 14,766 1,705 1,705 14,766 1,705 1,705 
SAAD: binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for individuals receiving LTC benefits (either caregiving 
allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). H: having been hospitalized in the last 12 months. HN: number of hospitalizations in the last 
12 months. HLS: number of days hospitalized during all hospitalizations in the last 12 months. POST: binary variable that takes the value 1 
after the reform in the Spanish LTC system. Coord is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if there is a coordination program between 
healthcare and LTC care services in the region, and 0 otherwise. 
Notes: Logit for the first hurdle; zero truncated Poisson for the second hurdle (two alternative dependent variables). Marginal effects are 
shown for the first hurdle; incidence rate ratios are shown for the second hurdle. For residuals we report the estimated coefficients. Bootstrap 
with 100 repetitions. The first hurdle (𝐻𝑖) coincides for both Poisson hurdle models.  
Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, level of education, self-reported health status, Katz Index, real income, real wealth, per 
capita public healthcare expenditure, number of public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, satisfaction with the public healthcare system, 
infection rate at hospital, year and regional dummies are not shown. Standard deviations between parentheses. *** means significance at 1% 
level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. 
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Table C2. Hurdle Poisson with control function for hospital admissions (logit for the first hurdle; zero-truncated Poisson for the 
second hurdle). Full Specification. 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 𝐻𝐵𝑖  
 𝐻𝑖 𝐻𝑁𝑖 𝐻𝐿𝑆𝑖 𝐻𝑖 𝐻𝑁𝑖 𝐻𝐿𝑆𝑖 
Male 0.056 1.341*** 0.321*** 0.050*** 0.454*** 0.035 
 (0.04) (0.40) (0.11) (0.02) (0.16) (0.04) 
Age -0.001 -0.092*** -0.020** -0.002 -0.031 0.009 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) 
Married/cohabiting -0.006 0.082 0.282*** -0.006 -0.242** 0.151*** 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.11) (0.03) 
Separated/divorced -0.001 0.292 0.017 -0.034 -0.509 -0.052 
 (0.03) (0.32) (0.09) (0.03) (0.33) (0.09) 
Single 0.059 2.678** 0.861*** -0.013 -0.293* 0.092** 
 (0.11) (1.14) (0.31) (0.02) (0.17) (0.05) 
Missing marital status -0.083 -2.491** -0.283 -0.048 -0.377 0.422* 
 (0.10) (1.25) (0.31) (0.06) (0.96) (0.22) 
No schooling -0.022** 0.141 0.111*** -0.018* 0.160 0.098*** 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) 
Elementary education -0.027 -0.528** -0.111* -0.006 0.081 0.047 
 (0.02) (0.22) (0.06) (0.01) (0.15) (0.04) 
Secondary education -0.038 -1.567*** -0.424*** -0.019 -0.364* -0.067 
 (0.05) (0.51) (0.14) (0.02) (0.20) (0.05) 
Health status: excellent -0.147*** -1.176*** -1.094*** -0.171*** -1.192*** -1.057*** 
 (0.03) (0.33) (0.16) (0.03) (0.33) (0.16) 
Health status: good -0.151*** -2.001** -0.843*** -0.157*** -2.029** -0.827*** 
 (0.01) (0.99) (0.07) (0.01) (0.99) (0.07) 
Health status: fair -0.094*** -0.336*** -0.350*** -0.080*** -0.346*** -0.337*** 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.03) 
Dependency: Katz1 0.137 3.011*** 1.159*** -0.040 -0.365 0.902*** 
 (0.11) (1.13) (0.31) (0.10) (1.10) (0.30) 
Dependency: Katz2 0.233 4.349** 0.773 -0.081 -0.957 0.696 
 (0.16) (1.71) (0.47) (0.19) (1.99) (0.53) 
Dependency: Katz3 0.223 5.249*** 1.719*** -0.159 -1.330 1.405* 
 (0.18)  (0.53) (0.25) (0.85) (0.72) 
Real wealth 
(€1,000,000) -0.001 -0.438*** -0.018 0.009 -0.157 0.041** 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02) 
Real income (€1,000) -0.214 12.440*** -7.731*** 0.130 -2.212 -6.251*** 
 (0.36) (3.93) (1.12) (0.18) (2.24) (0.66) 
Public healthcare 
expenditure. (€1,000) -0.083 -2.025** 0.572*** -0.076 -1.886** 0.328*** 
 (0.08) (0.91) (0.22) (0.08) (0.89) (0.22) 
Infection rate 0.011 -0.997** -0.387*** 0.024 -0.918** -0.440*** 
 (0.04) (0.43) (0.12) (0.04) (0.46) (0.13) 
Satisfaction with public 
healthcare system 0.001 0.004 -0.014*** 0.001 0.002 -0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Public beds (1,000 
inhabitants) 0.005 -0.045 0.021 0.000 -0.020 0.007 
 (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) 
Constant  11.302*** 1.294  4.892** -0.413 
  (3.14) (0.85)  (1.98) (0.50) 
N 14,766 1,705 1,705 14,766 1,705 1,705 
 
Note: H: having been hospitalized in the last 12 months. HN: number of hospitalizations in the last 12 months. HLS: length of stay at 
hospital during all hospitalizations in the last 12 months. CA: caregiving allowance. HB: home care benefits. The dependency degree is 
approximated using the Katz Index (Katz, 1983). The Katz Index determines functional status as a measurement of the ability to perform six 
daily living activities independently. We have computed this index using the information on daily living activities provided by SHARE. 
Respondents have been classified into four categories: Katz0 indicates that the individual performs all activities independently; Katz1 
indicates that the individual performs four or five activities independently (which could be identified as a moderate degree of dependency); 
Katz2 indicates that the individual only performs two or three activities independently (severe dependency); Katz3 indicates that the 
individual needs help for all activities (or all but one), and should therefore be considered a major dependent. Logit for the first hurdle; zero 
truncated Poisson for the second hurdle (two alternative dependent variables). Marginal effects are shown for the first hurdle; incidence rate 
ratios are shown for the second hurdle. For residuals, we report the estimated coefficients. Bootstrap with 100 repetitions. The first hurdle 
(𝐻𝑖) coincides for both Poisson hurdle models. Year and regional dummies are not shown. Standard deviations between parentheses. *** 
means significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. F-test of residuals is distributed according to F(2,14726) for the logit model, 
F(2,1665) 
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Table C3. Panel data estimates 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 
 
𝐻𝐵𝑖 
 
 𝐻𝑖 𝐻𝑁𝑖  𝐻𝐿𝑆𝑖 𝐻𝑖 𝐻𝑁𝑖  𝐻𝐿𝑆𝑖 
A. Baseline       
SAAD 0.053*** 1.012** 0.780*** 0.041*** 0.957 1.175*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) 
SAAD*POST -0.078*** 0.712*** 0.705*** 0.007 0.789*** 0.612*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
B. Coordination Plans       
SAAD 0.078*** 1.756*** 0.786*** 0.047*** 1.041 1.165*** 
 (0.01) (0.15) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) 
SAAD*POST -0.070*** 0.847*** 0.801*** 0.03 0.874** 0.733*** 
 (0.01) (0.17) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Coordination 0.031 0.887 0.965 0.029 0.947 0.9847 
 (0.01) (0.25) (0.04) (0.01) (0.20) (0.06) 
Coordination* POST -0.084*** 1.113 0.924 -0.082*** 0.941 0.086 
 (0.02) (0.27) (0.04) (0.01) (0.18) (0.04) 
SAAD *Coord -0.024 1.302*** 0.965 -0.015 1.441 1.372*** 
 (0.02) (0.21) (0.7) (0.01) (0.23) (0.04) 
SAAD* Coord *POST -0.101*** 0.879*** 1.104 -0.164*** 0.775*** 0.657*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) 
C. Effect of budgetary cuts       
SAAD 0.068*** 0.814 0.853*** 0.041*** 1.001 1.275*** 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
SAAD*POST (2011&2013) -0.095* 0.825 0.874*** -0.020 0.505 0.812*** 
 (0.02) (0.57) (0.02) (0.05) (0.88) (0.18) 
SAAD*POST (2013) -0.214 1.117*** 1.286** 0.589 1.326*** 1.465** 
 (1.09) (0.00) (0.41) (1.01) (0.05) (0.15) 
N 5,647 650 650 5,647 650 650 
Note: H refers to having been hospitalized in the last 12 months. HN: number of hospitalizations in the last 12 months. HLS: length of stay at 
hospital during all hospitalizations in the last 12 months. 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖 : binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for 
individuals receiving LTC benefits (either caregiving allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). POST: binary variable that takes the 
value 1 after the reform in the Spanish LTC system. Fixed effects logit for the first hurdle and fixed effects (H) and truncated Poisson for the 
second hurdle (HN and HLS). Marginal effects are shown for the first hurdle; incidence rate ratios are shown for the second hurdle. 
Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, self-reported health status, Katz Index, real income, real wealth, per capita public 
healthcare expenditure, number of public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, satisfaction with the public healthcare system, infection rate at 
hospital, year and regional dummies are not shown. Standard deviations between parentheses. *** means significance at 1% level, ** at 5% 
level, * at 10% level 
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Appendix D. Mechanisms and falsification test 
 
Table D1. Descriptive statistics for mechanism variables 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 𝐻𝐵𝑖 Any SAAD 
benefit 
No SAAD 
benefit 
Depressed 53.00 58.36 54.86 35.02 
Would prefer to be dead 18.64 20.56 19.38 7.48 
Lives alone 10.52 22.82 16.27 11.60 
Adapted house 4.13 6.45 5.18 2.78 
Has visited GP in the last year 42.48 53.48 47.37 38.97 
Number of visits to GP 8.73 12.63 10.66 6.72 
 (10.94) (16.40) (14.09) (8.69) 
Has visited a dentist in the last year 14.38 12.19 13.79 18.66 
Has ever been diagnosed with cataracts 10.51 20.21 14.83 8.59 
Surgery: Cataracts 0.13 0.35 0.24 0.24 
Household able to make ends meet     
With great difficulty 22.90 18.82 21.29 14.56 
With some difficulty 37.82 39.37 37.88 35.11 
Fairly easily 26.23 31.01 28.71 33.88 
Easily 13.05 10.80 12.12 16.45 
N 751 503 1,254 13,512 
CA: caregiving allowance. HB: home care benefits. 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖: binary variable that takes the value 1 for individuals receiving public LTC 
subsidies (both caregiving allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) or home care support (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). Standard deviation is depicted in parentheses for continuous 
variables. Note: 5,860 individuals have visited their GP in the last year: 319 receiving 𝐶𝐴, 307 receiving 𝐻𝐵, 626 receiving any SAAD 
benefit, 5,234 not receiving SAAD benefit. 
 
 
 
Table D2. Visits to GP. Logit for the first hurdle; zero truncated Poisson for the second hurdle. Marginal effects are shown for the 
first hurdle; incidence rate ratio is shown for the second hurdle. Bootstrap after 100 repetitions. Using IV for SAAD and 
SAAD*POST. 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 
 
𝐻𝐵𝑖 
 
 𝐻𝑎𝑠 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑃𝑖 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑃 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 𝐻𝑎𝑠 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑃𝑖 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑃 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 
SAAD 0.123*** 1.161*** 0.062* 1.279*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
SAAD*POST 0.088 1.074** -0.008 1.070** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
Chi-square (38) 694.76 8,379.23 685.65 8,510.51 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 14,766 5,860 14,766 5,860 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖: binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for individuals receiving LTC benefits (either caregiving 
allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). POST: binary variable that takes the value 1 after the reform in the Spanish LTC system. 
GP: general practitioner 
Notes: Logit for the first hurdle; zero truncated Poisson for the second hurdle (two alternative dependent variables). Marginal effects are 
shown for the first hurdle; incidence rate ratios are shown for the second hurdle. For residuals, we report the estimated coefficients. Bootstrap 
with 100 repetitions. The first hurdle (𝐻𝑖) coincides for both hurdle Poisson models. Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, 
level of education, self-reported health status, Katz Index, real income, real wealth, year and regional dummies are not shown. Standard 
deviation between parentheses. *** means significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. 
   
 
 
 
51 
 
Table D3. Probit for the probability of being depressed, would prefer to be dead, living alone, and living in an adapted household. 
Marginal effects. Bootstrap after 100 repetitions. Using IV for SAAD and SAAD*POST. 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 
 
𝐻𝐵𝑖 
 
 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑖 𝐴𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑖 𝐴𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 
SAAD 0.163*** 0.095*** 0.008 0.009 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.034*** 0.007 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
SAAD*POST -0.025*** -0.079*** -0.074*** 0.001 0.032 -0.054*** -0.026*** 0.020*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Chi-square (32) 1449.44 699.20 4366.07 335.93 1416.48 656.47 4365.06 343.43 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖: binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for individuals receiving LTC benefits (either caregiving 
allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑐𝑡) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). POST: binary variable that takes the value 1 after the reform in the Spanish LTC system. 
Dead: binary variable that takes the value 1 if the individual has reported preferring to be dead, and 0 otherwise. Depressed: binary variable 
that takes the value 1 if the individual has reported feeling depressed, and 0 otherwise. Alone: binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
individual lives alone (0 otherwise). Adapted house: binary variable that takes the value 1 if the household has special features catering for 
persons with physical impairments or health problems, and 0 otherwise. 
Note: Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, level of education, real income, real wealth, year and regional dummies are not 
shown. Standard deviation between parentheses. *** means significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.  
 
 
 
Table D4. Effects of SAAD on Household Finances. Marginal effects. Bootstrap after 100 repetitions. Using IV for SAAD and 
SAAD*POST. 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 
 
𝐻𝐵𝑖 
 
 Household able to make ends meet Household able to make ends meet 
 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖  𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖  𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖  𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖  
SAAD -0.023 0.005 0.011 0.025 0.042** 0.006 -0.017 -0.064*** 
 (0.040) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.018 (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) 
SAAD*POST -0.064** -0.044*  0.083*** 0.010 0.041 0.160*** -0.091* -0.071*  
 (0.025) (0.016) (0.026) (0.04) (0.037) (0.05) (0.05) (0.039) 
Chi-square (32) 18.725 21.417 6.32 55.46 10.633 16.548 2.517 39.803 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) 
N 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖: binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for individuals receiving LTC benefits (either caregiving 
allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). POST: binary variable that takes the value 1 after the reform in the Spanish LTC system. 
Note: Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, level of education, real income, real wealth, year and regional dummies are not 
shown. Standard deviation between parentheses. *** means significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level 
 
Table D5. Effects of SAAD on Dental Care 
 𝐶𝐴𝑖 
 
𝐻𝐵𝑖 
 
 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖 
SAAD -0.077** -0.126*** 0.020 -0.021 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) 
SAAD*POST 0.021 0.078* -0.020 0.020 
 (0.028) (0.055) (0.033) (0.036) 
Chi-square (38) 37.881 9.792 25.790 17.505 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 14,766 1,392 14,766 1,392 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑖: binary variable representing the treatment group that takes the value 1 for individuals receiving LTC benefits (either caregiving 
allowances (𝐶𝐴𝑖) or home care benefits (𝐻𝐵𝑖)). POST: binary variable that takes the value 1 after the reform in the Spanish LTC system. 
Dentist: binary variable that takes the value 1 if the individual has visited the dentist in the last year. Cataract surgery: binary variable that 
takes the value 1 if the individual has undergone cataract surgery. Regressions for cataract surgery have been performed on the subsample 
diagnosed with cataracts. 
 
